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Under the Radar:  
The Role of Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing in Protecting and Realizing Human Rights 
connected to Natural Resources 
 
International environmental law and international human rights law are increasingly cross-fertilizing with 
regard to the rights of indigenous peoples1 and local communities over natural resources traditionally used 
by them.2 As a result, fair and equitable benefit-sharing from the use of these natural resources is 
becoming increasingly relevant to prior environmental and socio-cultural assessments and consent 
processes. This cross-fertilization,3 however, remains under-explored. Benefit-sharing has elicited little 
interest among international human rights lawyers,4 who have concentrated their efforts on the complex 
and still unsettled notion of free prior informed consent (FPIC)5 and difficulties in obtaining 
meaningful and appropriate compensation for harm caused by extractive activities.6 In addition, 
benefit-sharing is often perceived as a threat to the rights of indigenous peoples. It is associated with 
an offer of money or other economic advantage (for instance, employment) in exchange for obtaining 
consent,7 which “encourages a climate of disrespect towards indigenous peoples.”8 Benefit-sharing 
has resulted in “attempts to undermine social cohesion of affected communities” through bribes to 
community leaders or selective negotiations tactics.9 In particular, monetary benefit-sharing is known 
to “destruct the social network” of indigenous groups,10 putting in place self-defeating or paternalistic 
mechanisms that are not responsive to communities’ specific needs.11 Regional human rights bodies 
have thus had occasion to point out to situations in which promised benefit-sharing were not 
delivered,12 or benefit-sharing arrangements were originally in place but broke down, and/or were 
weakened by ineffective State monitoring of outsiders’ activities.13 
                                               
1 Indigenous peoples’ right to natural resources is considered self-standing with respect to their right to land: eg, Final 
Report of the Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes on Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources (2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30, para 39; and Jérémie Gilbert, ‘The Right to Freely Dispose of 
Natural Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Right?’ (2013) 31 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 314. 
2 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights and the Environment John Knox: Framework 
Principles on Human Rights and the Environment (2017) UN Doc A/HRC/34/49, Principle 15. 
3 U Linderfalk, ‘Cross-fertilization in International Law’ (2015) 84 Nordic J Int'l L 428, at 436-438.  
4 It is not explicitly referred to in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP: UNGA Res. 
61/295, 2007). Even international human rights lawyers specifically focusing on international biodiversity law do not 
address benefit-sharing: eg, Ellen Desmet, Indigenous Rights Entwined with Nature Conservation (Intersentia, 2011). 
5 E.g. UN Expert Mechanism, Advice no. 4: Follow-up report on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in 
decision- making, with a focus on extractive industries, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/55, paras 38(b), 39(h) and 43 (2012); M 
Århén, Indigenous Peoples in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press, 2016), 217-218; and C 
Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior Consultation in 
Social Minefields’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 263. 
6 E.g. F Lenzerini (ed), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
7 I-AmCtHR, Kichwa Indigenous Communitiy of Sarayaku v Ecuador (Merits and reparations, Judgment of 27 June 
2012), para. 194. 
8 Ibid, paras. 193-194. 
9 Ibid, para. 186. J Gilbert & C Doyle, ‘A New Dawn over the Land: Shedding Light on Collective Ownership and 
Consent’ in S Allen and A Xanthaki eds., Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(2011) 289. 
10 N Gomez, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Psychosocial Reparations: The Experience with Latin American Indigenous 
Communities’ in Lenzerini (n 6) 143, 158. 
11 G Citrioni & K. Quintana Osuna, ‘Reparations for Indigenous Peoples in the Case of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’ in Lenzerini (n 6) 317, 340 and 324. 
12 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Afr. Comm.), Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) 
and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (4 February 2010) Case 
276/2003, para. 274. 
13 IACtHR, Case of Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 25 November 
2015, paras. 77-84 and 183. 
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All these benefit-sharing practices, however, can be considered “contrary to international 
standards” interpreted in good faith.14 This article seeks to clarify existing standards of international 
human rights and environmental law that, pieced together, offer an interpretation of benefit-sharing that 
is very far from currently wide-spread benefit-sharing practices. The proposed interpretation, instead, 
supports a role for benefit-sharing that is more conducive to, and intertwined with, FPIC. This 
interpretation can contribute to clarifying the limits of national sovereignty over national resources in 
light of international human rights of indigenous peoples15 and international obligations on 
environmental protection.16 In addition, the article explores avenues for further developing a mutually 
supportive interpretation of benefit-sharing that sheds light on the extent to which international law may 
make space for different worldviews of nature and development17 embodied in communities’ distinctive 
ways of life.18 The proposed interpretation, in other words, illuminates the potential of international 
benefit-sharing obligations to challenge mainstream conceptions of economic development and 
attempts to romanticize, ossify, or bottle communities’ worldviews into neo-liberal or neo-colonial 
agendas.19 
The article will first assess the current degree of cross-fertilization of international human 
rights and environmental law on benefit-sharing from the use of natural resources, focusing in particular 
on international biodiversity law (Section 1). It will then unveil further avenues to pursue a mutually 
supportive interpretation by strategically analysing the interplay of international benefit-sharing 
obligations 20 with environmental assessment and consent (Section 1). This will serve to substantiate four 
inter-linked normative claims. Benefit-sharing has a substantive core linked to communities’ choice and 
capabilities, as well as a procedural one linked to communities’ agency as part of a concerted, culturally 
appropriate and iterative dialogue with the State. So understood, benefit-sharing expands considerably the 
scope and approach of environmental assessments and consultation practices. It allows to move beyond 
a defensive approach that conceptualizes benefit-sharing as a mere procedural “safeguard”21 towards a 
potentially transformative collaboration in light of indigenous understandings. Benefit-sharing should 
then be distinguished from compensation, with which it is often conflated,22 as it does not depend upon a 
violation of a right. Finally, the proposed interpretation of benefit-sharing has implications for 
understanding the status of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in international law (Section 3), as well as 
                                               
14 Kichwa, para. 186. Gilbert & Doyle (n 9) 289. 
15 F Francioni, ‘Natural Resources and Human Rights’ in E Morgera and K Kulovesi (eds), Research Handbook of 
International Law and Natural Resources 66 (Edward Elgar, 2016), in light of International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, art 1(2) and 2(1). 
16 Eg Francioni (n 15); V Barral, ‘National Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Environmental Challenges and 
Sustainable Development’, in Morgera and Kulovesi (n 15) 3; Århén (n 5), at 55; and F Lenzerini, 'Sovereignty 
Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples' (2006) 42 Tex Int'l LJ 155. 
17 A Barros, ‘The Fetish Mechanism: A Post-Dogmatic Case Study of the Atacama Desert Peoples and the Extractive 
Industries’ in C Lennox and D Short (eds), Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (Routldge, 2016) 223, 231-232. 
18 G Pentassuglia, ‘Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights’ (2011) 22 EJIL 165, 176; D 
McGregor, ‘Living Well with the Earth: Indigenous Rights and the Environment’ in Lennox and Short (n 17) 167, 175; 
Desmet (n 4), 58 and 175; and Francioni (n 15). 
19 E Reimerson, ‘Between Nature and Culture: Exploring Space for Indigenous Agency in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’ (2013) 22 Envtl. Pol. 992; Y Uggla, ‘What is This Thing Called ‘Natural’? The Nature-culture Divide in 
Climate Change and Biodiversity Policy’ (2009) 17 J. Pol. Ecology 79. 
20 It has been argued elsewhere that fair and equitable benefit-sharing is a multi-dimensional international law concept, 
encompassing an inter-State as well as an intra-State dimension: E Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal 
Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing’ (2016) 27 EJIL 353. The present article focuses specifically on the intra-
State dimension of benefit-sharing. 
21 UN Special Rapporteur Anaya, Progress report on extractive industries, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/47, paras 52 and 62 
(2012). 
22 Making reference more consistently to “ensur[ing] reasonable benefit or compensation for indigenous peoples 
impacted by natural resource exploitation”: OHCHR, Mapping Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of 
a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment: Individual Report on the International Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2013), at 16-18 (emphasis added). 
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for businesses’ due diligence to respect the human rights of indigenous peoples and local communities 
(Section 4).  
 
1. The extent of cross-fertilization  
 
This section sheds light on the current degree of cross-fertilization between international human rights 
and environmental law. It also calls attention to the respective blindspots of these two areas of law, with 
a view to underscoring the need for furthering mutual supportiveness.  
International human rights law has placed benefit-sharing to the service of a number of specific 
human rights, thereby clarifying the minimum content of the international obligation of benefit-sharing. 
References to benefit-sharing have, however, relied on limited legal bases in international human rights 
law, which explains increasingly reliance by international human rights bodies on “universal 
standards”23 developed under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Consensus guidance 
adopted under the CBD, in turn, has clarified how to concretely apply benefit-sharing in the specialized 
context of natural resource and protected areas governance. CBD consensus guidance thus provides a 
pragmatic complement to the evolutionary interpretation of the human rights obligation of benefit-
sharing. CBD instruments, however, have not engaged explicitly with human rights language, avoiding 
questions related to minimum standards of protection and justiciability.  
 
1.1 The perspective of international human rights law 
 
On the human rights side, the only treaty-based reference to benefit-sharing in relation to indigenous and 
tribal peoples can be found in ILO Convention No 169. The right to participate in the use, management 
and conservation of natural resources “pertaining to [indigenous and tribal peoples’] lands” 
encompasses a right to participate in the benefits arising from these activities “wherever possible,” 
even when the State retains the ownership or other rights to these resources.24 This provision was 
considered one of the “most polemic” in the negotiating history of the ILO Convention and “entirely 
new.”25 Likely for these reasons, the Convention does not determine the exact scope of the benefit-
sharing obligation, allowing for considerable scope for discretion in its implementation. Such leeway 
serves to accommodate variations among domestic legal systems’ approaches to the recognition of 
indigenous and tribal peoples, but also the necessary flexibility for case-by-case implementation in 
the light of the specific circumstances of indigenous peoples.26 At the very least, the benefit-sharing 
provision arguably obliges State Parties to demonstrate when and why it is not possible to share 
benefits.27 
In practice, the ILO Convention provision on benefit-sharing has led to profit-sharing from 
                                               
23 A Fodella, ‘Indigenous Peoples, the Environment, and International Jurisprudence’ in N Boschiero, et al eds. 
International Courts and the Development of International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves (Springer, 2013), 
360, develops this argument about international human rights law, not international biodiversity law. 
24 International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention no. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries 1989, 28 ILM 1382, art 15. 
25 L Swepston, ‘New Step in the International Law on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989’ 
(1990) 15 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 677, 703. The only other reference to benefit-sharing in human rights law is in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights: Blogpost by Mikel Mancisidor, Is There Such a Thing as a Human Right to 
Science in International Law? (April 2015) at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/896. While the ILO Convention uses the verb 
to “participate” in benefits, its interpretative materials refer to benefit-sharing: e.g., Observation of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Experts, adopted 2009, published 99th ILC session (2010), para. 11. 
26 ILO, Monitoring Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights through ILO Conventions: A Compilation of ILO 
Supervisory Bodies’ Comments 2009-2010, Observation (Norway), Canadian Environmental Assessment Research 
Council 2009/80th session (2009), 95; ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights in Practice: A Guide to ILO 
Convention No 169 (2009), 107–108; and L Sargent, ‘The Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia´s Amazon Basin Region and 
ILO Convention No. 169: Real Rights or Rhetoric?’ (1998) 29 U. Miami Inter-Am. L Rev 451, 510. 
27 Swepston (n 25) 704-706. 
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extractive activities,28 which is a common feature of international human rights law and represents 
one of its blindspots. As former Special Rapporteur Anaya warned, “benefit sharing must go beyond 
restrictive approaches based solely on financial payments which, depending on the specific 
circumstances, may not be adequate for the communities receiving them.”29 In particular, empirical 
evidence suggests that non-monetary benefits may exceed the importance of monetary benefits for 
communities’ wellbeing.30 Furthermore, monetary benefits have had documented negative (including 
divisive) effects on communities, and have been linked to the exercise of undue influence and bribery. 
Benefit-sharing thus needs to be understood in its interaction with other obligations under ILO 
Convention 169: the assessments of social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impacts of planned 
development activities,31 good-faith consultation through indigenous peoples’ representative 
institutions,32 and cooperation with indigenous peoples in adopting environmental protection 
measures in their territories.33 It is the combination of these obligations that may allow to take into 
account indigenous peoples’ holistic worldviews of their “territories, which cover the total 
environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.”34 
The benefit-sharing provision of ILO Convention No 169 has proven influential, even when 
not formally applicable, in the Saramaka case35 and the subsequent “solid line of case law”36 of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Benefit-sharing has been considered a safeguard for 
indigenous and tribal peoples’ right to freely dispose of their natural resources as a means to 
determine their own social, cultural and economic development, and enjoy their way of life.37 As is 
well known, the Saramaka line of reasoning has had visible impact on the African framework on 
human rights,38 as well as on global human rights processes.39 As a result of these jurisprudential 
                                               
28 ILO, Report of the Committee Set Up to Examine the Representation Alleging Non-Observance by Ecuador of ILO 
Convention No. 169, Doc. GB.282/14/4 (2001), para. 44(3); Report of the Committee set up to Examine the 
Representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador of ILO Convention No. 169, ILO Doc. GB.282/14/4, para. 44(3) 
(2001). 
29 Special Rapporteur Anaya, Report on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, 
(2010) UN Doc. A/HRC/15/37, para. 80. 
30 R Wynberg & M Hauck, ‘People, Power and the Coast: Towards an Integrated, Just and Holistic Approach’ in R 
Wynberg & M Hauck (eds) Sharing Benefits from the Coast: Rights, Resources and Livelihoods (UCT Press, 2014) 
143, 158. 
31 ILO Convention, art 7(3). 
32 Combined reading with ILO Convention, arts 5-6. 
33 ILO Convention, art 7(4). 
34 ILO Convention, art 15(2); Swepston (n 25), 698; and Desmet (n 4), 88. 
35 IACtHR, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs), 28 November 2007. 
36 For a recount of this line of case law, see Kaliña and Lokono Joint Concurring Opinion of Humberto Antonio Sierra 
Porto and Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, paras. 4-9. 
37 Saramaka (Merits), paras. 93-95 on the basis also of Inter-American Convention, art 29(b). Reiterated in Kaliña and 
Lokono, para. 124; e.g. Århén (n 5), 93. 
38 G Pentassuglia, ‘Indigenous Groups and the Developing Jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: Some Reflections’ (2010) 3 UCL Hum. Rts. Rev. 150, 158 with respect to the Endorois case. See also 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of 
Kenya (26 May 2017) App. No 006/2012, para 191. 
39 Independent Expert on Environment and Human Rights, John Knox, Preliminary Report on the Issue of Human 
Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/22/43, para. 41 (2012) and Mapping Report, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/53, para. 78 (2013); UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Food, Oliver de Schutter, Large-scale land acquisitions and leases: A set of minimum principles and 
measures to address the human rights challenge, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/33/Add.2, paras. 30-33 (2009); Special 
Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/21/47 (n 21), paras. 52 and 62; UN Expert Mechanism, Indigenous Peoples and Human 
Rights, Setting a Framework for Consultation, Benefit-Sharing and Dispute Resolution, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/EMRIP/2009/5 (2008); and UN Expert Mechanism, Follow-up report on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision-making, with a focus on extractive industries, UN Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/2, para. 40 (2012). 
But it remains unclear whether the Human Rights Committee (HRC) relies upon the same notion of benefit-sharing 
found in Saramaka: note the lack of reference to benefit-sharing in Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
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developments, benefit-sharing has been repeatedly identified as one of three safeguards, together with 
prior impact assessment and FPIC, in the case of proposed extractives in or near indigenous lands. 
Equally, benefit-sharing has been considered as a safeguard in the case of proposed conservation 
activities, such as the establishment of protected areas, in indigenous lands. In this case, benefit-
sharing operates together with FPIC and indigenous peoples’ effective participation in management 
and monitoring of traditional territories, including continued access and use that are compatible with 
environmental protection.40 These obligations are triggered when proposed activities may threaten 
indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ physical or cultural survival.41 The Inter-American Court 
identified two situations in which such survival is at stake: either proposed development projects or 
conservation initiatives concern natural resources that are traditionally used by indigenous and tribal 
peoples; or the extraction of natural resources (notably minerals) that are not traditionally used by 
indigenous peoples is likely to affect other natural resources that are.42 This is in line with ILO 
monitoring bodies’ view that not only projects implemented in traditional lands, but also those having 
an impact on communities’ life require a heightened level of protection.43 It has been noted, however, 
that the African Commission’s approach is more progressive than the Inter-American Court’s one, as 
the former underscored the need to protect natural resources found on or under indigenous land, rather 
than only those resources the extraction of which may have a negative impact on the group 
indirectly.44 
At the time of the Saramaka case, the Inter-American Court argued that benefit-sharing was 
already recognized in “the text of several international instruments.”45 But actually there were only 
few “tentative”46 legal bases on benefit-sharing in international human rights law on which it could 
rely upon. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), for instance, does 
not include an explicit reference to benefit-sharing. This has been considered implicit in its provisions 
on the right to natural resources over time (after the Saramaka decision).47 The Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)48 and the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
Peoples49 sporadically mentioned benefit-sharing before, but have equally focused more 
                                               
Rights (OHCHR), Mapping Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and 
Sustainable Environment: Individual Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2013).  
40 See Endorois and Kaliña and Lokono; and Special Rapporteur Anaya, Cases examined by the Special Rapporteur 
(June 2009 – July 2010), UN Doc. A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, paras. 257-267 (2010); and Report of the Special Rapporteur 
Anaya to the General Assembly (2016) UN Doc A/71/229, which does not refer to benefit-sharing as such, but to 
partnership building (paras 74 and 80). 
41 Saramaka (Merits), paras. 122-123; P Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights 352 (Manchester 
University Press, 2002), 282. 
42 Saramaka (Merits), paras. 155-158. 
43 S Errico, ‘The Controversial Issue of Natural Resources: Balancing States’ Sovereignty with Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights’ in Allen and Xanthaki (n 9), 348.  
44 Pentassuglia (n 38), 160. 
45 Saramaka (Merits), para. 130 and fn 128; and para. 138 and fn 137. 
46 Pentassuglia (n 38), 169. 
47 UNDRIP, art 31; Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/15/37 (n 29), paras. 67 and 76-78 (2010); UNPFII, Review of 
World Bank operational policies, UN Doc. E/C.19/2013/15, para. 27 (2013); OHCHR, Mapping Human Rights 
Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment: Individual Report on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2013), 45-46. 
48 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 7 March 1966, 660 UNTS 195; 
Fn 138, para. 140 referring to CERD, Consideration of Reports submitted by State Parties under Article 9 of the 
Convention, Concluding Observations on Ecuador, UN Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/2, para. 16 (2003). Note that a benefit-
sharing requirement does not feature in the CERD General Recommendation n. 23 on Indigenous Peoples UN Doc. 
A/52/18, annex V (1997), but references to profit-sharing from natural resource use were made by CERD: 
Consideration of Reports, Comments and Information Submitted by States Parties: Bolivia, UN Doc. A/66/18, para. 
43(7)(f) (2012); and Consideration of Reports, Comments and Information Submitted by States Parties: Bolivia, UN 
Doc. A/56/18, para. 335 (2001). 
49 Referring to “mutually acceptable benefit-sharing” as part of FPIC: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/90, 
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systematically on benefit-sharing post Saramaka.  
The limited legal bases on benefit-sharing under international human rights law may explain 
why the Inter-American Court,50 CERD51 and other global human rights processes52 have made 
increasingly reference to other standards developed under the CBD. This is notably case of the CBD 
Akwé: Kon Guidelines on socio-cultural and environmental impact assessments, which include 
reference to benefit-sharing.53 Similar is the case of benefit-sharing guidance included in CBD 
decisions on protected areas,54 that have been identified as relevant by human rights bodies to prevent 
negative impacts from conservation activities on indigenous and tribal peoples’ territories.55 But it 
has only been in the 2015 Kaliña and Lokono decision that the Inter-American Court has been 
particularly explicit about the need for, and merits of, mutual supportiveness with consensus guidance 
adopted under the CBD.56 On that occasion, the Court underscored States’ obligations to protect, in 
a manner compatible with their international environmental obligations, indigenous peoples’ rights 
to a dignified life and to cultural identity connected with natural resources on their traditional 
territories.57  
Admittedly, universal and regional human rights jurisprudence has not developed a consistent 
legal argumentation on benefit-sharing, and interpretative guidance has gradually been formulated across 
various decisions and other international materials. The argument put forward here is that on the whole, 
international human rights has identified in significant detail the minimum level of protection afforded 
by benefit-sharing, although guidance on how to implement benefit-sharing obligations remains limited 
and quite abstract. The latter is another important blindspot in international human rights law. 
International human rights processes have indicated that prior environmental and socio-
cultural assessments (which include consideration of benefit-sharing options) should be prepared by 
an independent, technically qualified entity with the “active participation of indigenous communities 
concerned.”58 In addition, these assessments must respect indigenous traditions and cultures.59 This 
is a key clarification to ensure that communities influence the terms of the debate, rather than 
participate in a process already framed around a predetermined set of development options. Thus 
conceived, these assessments are expected to contribute to realize indigenous peoples’ right to 
                                               
para. 66 (2003); which was reiterated in his Progress report on preparatory work for the study regarding best practices 
carried out to implement the recommendations contained in the annual reports of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.4, para. 11. 
50 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment 
(Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 12 August 2008, para. 41 
and fn 23. 
51 Which appears confirmed in CERD, Concluding observations on the combined thirteenth to fifteenth periodic reports 
of Suriname, (2015) UN Doc. CERD/C/SUR/CO/13-15, para. 26. 
52 CBD art 8(j) was referred to by UNPFII, Review of Developments pertaining to the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2001/2, para. 15 
(2001). The Akwé: Kon Guidelines (CBD Decision VII/16C (2004), Annex) were referred to as a pre-condition for 
benefit-sharing by CERD (n 51); Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/15/37 (n 29), para. 73, and by the Expert 
Mechanism, Progress report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, (2010) 
UN Doc. A/HRC/15/35, para. 37. The CBD work programme on protected areas (CBD Decision VII/28 (2004), Annex) 
was referred to by the Expert Mechanism, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/35, para. 37 (2010).  
53 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 52), paras. 46 and 56. 
54 Work programme on protected areas (n 52), paras. 2(1) and 2(1)(4) (while the latter refers to both benefit- and cost-
sharing, the focus on benefit-sharing is clarified in CBD Decision IX/18 (2008), preamble para. 5). 
55 See generally Reimerson (n 19).  
56 CBD arts 8(j), 10 and 14: Kaliña and Lokono, paras. 173-174, 177-178, 181 and 214 fn 247, making reference to 
the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, CBD Decision VII/12 (2004), 
Annex II and the CBD work programme on protected areas (n 52). 
57 Kaliña and Lokono, paras. 181 and 193. 
58 Kichwa, para. 300; Kaliña and Lokono, para. 214; CERD (n 51), para. 26. 
59 Saramaka (Interpretation), para. 41; Kichwa, para. 206; Kaliña and Lokono, para. 215; also citing Principle 10 of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) ‘UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 vol 1, Annex 1. 
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participate in public affairs.60 In addition, human rights bodies have recommended establishing 
processes for recording indigenous communities’ views also when they are unable to attend public 
meetings because of remoteness or poor health, as well as in other forms than written ones.61 
Governments are further expected to provide adequate human, financial, technical and legal resources 
to support indigenous expertise, proportionally to the scale of the proposed development.62 In 
addition, the Guidelines recommend involving indigenous communities in the financial auditing 
processes of the development to ensure that the resources invested are used effectively.63  
Procedural safeguards have thus featured prominently in human rights case law. International 
human rights bodies have also underscored the need for benefit-sharing agreements to be recorded 
formally,64 in a legally binding agreement embodying the conditions for granting FPIC in light of 
communities’ worldviews, and the safeguards against the disrespect of such consent after it is 
granted.65 Benefit-sharing agreements are further expected to undergo third-party verification,66 and 
be made subject to an ongoing review of their functioning jointly with indigenous peoples.67  
Regional human rights jurisprudence has also elaborated on the need for judicial protection. 
The Inter-American Court emphasized States’ obligation to deploy effective means to safeguard 
rights through judicial organs, and provide the means to execute relevant decisions of public 
authorities and judgments.68 Remedies offered by the State should provide a “real possibility” for 
indigenous and tribal peoples to defend their rights and exercise effective control over their territory,69 
including through the recognition of legal standing to file administrative, judicial or other type of 
action collectively, through their representatives, or individually, taking into account their customs 
and cultural characteristics. Reference is also made to guarantees of access to justice that are 
accessible, simple and within reasonable timeframes; access to technical and legal assistance, 
ensuring the community members can be understood in and can understand legal proceedings; and 
facilitation of physical access to administrative and judicial institutions in light of geographical 
distance, elevated costs or other challenges.70 Such measures are also expected to respect internal 
mechanisms for deciding disputes on indigenous issues, which are in harmony with human rights.71  
Finally, justiciability rests on the obligation for States to enshrine international benefit-sharing 
obligations in national law to clarify that benefit-sharing is an entitlement, not a mere privilege. This 
implies that benefit-sharing obligations are irrevocable and part of a legally backed opportunity to 
effectively control natural resources without outside interference.72 Appropriate national legislation 
on benefit-sharing has been considered a guarantee of non-repetition by the Inter-American Court.73 
Integrating these procedural guarantees as essential conditions for benefit-sharing under the CBD 
would respond to some of the main shortcomings arising from the lack of explicit discussion of human 
rights standards under international biodiversity law, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
1.2 The perspective of international environmental law 
 
                                               
60 Kaliña and Lokono, paras. 197 and 202-203. 
61 Ibid, para. 17. 
62 Ibid, paras. 18 and 64-66 and 70. 
63 Ibid, para. 46. 
64 Ibid, para. 193. 
65 UN Expert Mechanism (n 5), para. 43; Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/15/37 (n 29), para 46. 
66 UNPFII (n 47), para. 29. 
67 ILO, Observation on Norway (n 26). 
68 Kaliña and Lokono, paras. 239-240. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid, para. 251(3). 
71 Ibid, para. 251(5). 
72 Ibid, para 134; referring to Saramaka, para 115. 
73 Saramaka (Merits), para. 194.d; Kaliña and Lokono, para. 305(d); and Kichwa paras. 299-300. 
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To an environmental lawyer, the growing references in international human rights materials to the CBD 
may appear surprising. The CBD and its decisions do not include human rights terminology.74 Rather, 
CBD negotiations provide ample evidence of States’ attempts to firewall this regime from 
international human rights law, resulting in convoluted and heavily qualified language that may have 
human rights implications.75 Clearly certain States among the 196 CBD Parties do not wish to import 
through the backdoor of the CBD international standards on indigenous peoples deriving from global 
or regional human rights regimes to which they are not party, particularly when they have emphasized 
constitutional limitations to the implementation of UNDRIP.76  
In addition, the linkage between benefit-sharing and natural resources under the Convention 
is not immediately obvious. The relevant treaty basis under the CBD is a qualified obligation to 
“encourage” equitable benefit-sharing from the use of traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples 
and local communities,77 interpreted in combination with the obligation to protect indigenous and 
local communities’ customary sustainable use of biological resources.78 The CBD benefit-sharing 
obligation is thus arguably triggered by the ecosystem stewardship of indigenous peoples and local 
communities,79 which hinges on the intrinsic connection between these communities’ knowledge and 
their natural resources –in other words, the development and transmission of traditional knowledge 
through the management of traditionally used natural resources.80 Such knowledge is thus embodied 
in traditional lifestyles81 that are inextricably linked to natural resources, shared cultural identity and 
customary rules.82 This resonates with the understanding, under international human rights law, of 
the traditional use of natural resources as “part of a way of life.”83  
The reticence of certain CBD State Parties to engage explicitly in human rights questions has 
resulted in guidance that does not include minimum guarantees or explicit limits to State discretion. 
This is the most significant blindspot in international biodiversity law. CBD guidance does provide, 
                                               
74 P Birnie, A Boyle & C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment 626-628 (Oxford University Press, 2009); 
D Shelton, ‘Principle 22: Indigenous People and Sustainable Development’ in Jorge Viñuales ed., The Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015) 541, 543. 
75 Note, for instance, the continued opposition of some CBD parties to making unequivocal reference to the right to “prior 
informed consent” of indigenous peoples (eg CBD, Mo’otz Kuxtal voluntary guidelines for the development of 
mechanisms, legislation or other appropriate initiatives to ensure the “prior informed consent”, “free prior informed 
consent” or “approval and involvement”, depending on national circumstances, of indigenous peoples and local 
communities for accessing their knowledge, innovations and practices, the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from the use and application of such knowledge, innovations and practices and for reporting and preventing 
unauthorized access to such knowledge, innovations and practices, CBD Decision XIII/18, para. 6 (2016)). 
76 E Morgera. Against All Odds: The Contribution of the Convention on Biological Diversity to International Human 
Rights Law, in Denis Alland et al, eds., Unity and Diversity of International Law (2014) 983. For a recent report of 
CBD parties’ views on importing international human rights law terminology with regard to indigenous peoples, see E 
Tsioumani et al, “Summary and Analysis of the UN Biodiversity Conference”, 9:678 Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) 
12-13 (2016). 
77 CBD art 8(j). Other provisions in the Convention (notably arts 1 and 15) focus instead on an inter-State notion of 
benefit-sharing in the specific context of bioprospecting, although in time they have come to be understood also in an 
intra-State perspective: E Morgera et al, Unraveling the Nagoya Protocol: A Commentary of the Protocol on Access 
and Benefit-Sharing to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff, 2014), 24-30. 
78 CBD art 10(c). 
79 Principles of the Ecosystem Approach, Decision V/6 (2000), para. 9, and CBD Decision VII/11 (2004), Annex I, 
annotations to rationale to Principle 4.’ This appears to be reflected in the General Assembly, Strategic Framework for 
the period 2012-2013 (UN Doc. A/65/6/Rev.1), para. 11(24)(b) and for 2014-2015 (UN Doc. A/67/6 (prog 11)), para. 
11(16). See discussion in E Morgera, ‘Ecosystem and Precautionary Approach’ in E Morgera & J Razzaque, eds., 
Encyclopedia of Environmental Law: Biodiversity and Nature Protection Law (Edward Elgar, 2017) 70. 
80 In the light of the placement of CBD art 8(j) in the context of in situ conservation (CBD Art 8). J Gibson, ‘Community 
Rights to Culture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in Allen and Xanthaki (n 9) 434, at 434-435 
81 On the basis of the wording of CBD Article 8(j): see definition of traditional knowledge in Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 
53). 
82 See generally B Tobin, Indigenous Peoples, Customary Law and Human Rights: Why Living Law Matters 
(Routledge, 2014). 
83 Thornberry (n 41), 334 and 353. 
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on the other hand, more detailed, practical guidance on how to implement benefit-sharing in the 
context of natural resource governance, which fills a gap in international human rights law. CBD 
guidance focuses on pragmatic considerations underlying benefit-sharing to counterbalance short-
term gains motivating ecosystem degradation, by protecting the stake in conservation for those 
communities that more closely interact with nature. Benefit-sharing is thus seen as a means to ensure 
compliance with environmental protection law.84 It serves as an incentive for ecosystem stewards’ 
positive contribution to humanity's well-being that derives from the ecosystem services they provide, 
maintain or restore.85 This can arguably be inferred from CBD Parties’ consensus on the types of 
benefit to be shared. First, more elaborate options on monetary benefit-sharing are outlined under the 
CBD than in international human rights law. They include not only profit-sharing through trust funds, 
but also licenses with preferential terms, job creation for communities (which find resonance in the 
Endorois decision of the African Commission86), and payments for ecosystem services.87 In addition, 
CBD Parties have identified benefits that support indigenous peoples’ own economic activities, such 
as: fostering local enterprises, participating in others’ enterprises and projects, offering direct 
investment opportunities, facilitating access to markets, and supporting the diversification of income-
generating (economic) opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses.88 Further types of 
benefits have been identified to improve and consolidate the conditions under which ecosystem 
stewards and traditional knowledge holders develop and maintain their knowledge and practices: 
information sharing, capacity building, scientific cooperation, or assistance in diversifying 
management capacities,89 as well as the legal recognition for community-based natural resource 
management and conservation,90 the incorporation of traditional knowledge in environmental and 
socio-cultural impact assessments91 and in natural resource management planning.92 The rationale of 
the CBD benefit-sharing obligation can thus also be understood as recognition for past and present 
contributions of indigenous peoples and local communities to global environmental objectives with 
a view to ensuring that their traditional practices continue in the future.93 
Under the CBD, therefore, a variety of economic and non-economic benefits have been 
identified, amounting to a “menu” that allows for a large margin of discretion in implementation. 
This contrasts with the general laconicism and emphasis on monetary approaches of international 
human rights law with regard to benefit-sharing modalities discussed above. A wider choice of 
benefits could allow taking into account communities’ needs, values, and priorities on a case-by-case 
basis, as required under international human rights law, on the basis of a finer-grained understanding 
of opportunities within natural resource governance. Equally, however, the menu of benefits reveals 
                                               
84 Addis Ababa Guidelines (n 56), rationale to Principle 4 and operational guideline to Principle 12. 
85 Principles of the Ecosystem Approach (n 79), para 9. 
86 Endorois, para 297. 
87 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 52), para. 46. See M Menton and A Bennett, ‘PES: Payments for Ecosystem Services and 
Poverty Alleviation?’ and I Porras and N Asquith, ‘Scaling-up Conditional Transfers for Environmental Protection and 
Poverty Alleviation’ in K. Schreckenberg et al (eds), Ecosystem Services and Poverty Alleviation: Trade-offs and 
Governance (Routledge, 2018) 189 and 204 respectively. 
88 CBD, Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism, Decision V/25 (2000), paras. 22–23, 43. 
89 Principles of the Ecosystem Approach (n 79), para 9; CBD expanded work programme on forest biodiversity, 
Decision VI/22 (2002), at goal 5, objective 1, activities; CBD work programme on mountain biodiversity, CBD 
decision VII/27 (2004), Annex, para. 1.3.7; Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 23), paras. 40 and 46; Addis Ababa Guidelines (n 
56), rationale to Principle 4; CBD, Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
the Benefits Arising out of Their Utilization, CBD Decision VI/24 (2002) Annex, para. 50. 
90 Eg CBD Decision VI/22 (n 89), para. 31 and programme element 1, Goal 4, objective 3; CBD work programme on 
mountain biodiversity (n 89), paras 2.2.1-2.2.5. 
91 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 52), para. 56. 
92 Addis Ababa Guidelines (n 56), operational guidelines to Principle 4; and CBD work programme on forest 
biodiversity (n 89), para 34. See also Agenda 21 (1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 vol 1, Annex II, para. 15(4)(g) 
and Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (2002) UN Doc A/CONF.199/20, Resolution 2, para. 44(j). 
93 E Morgera, ‘Justice, Equity and Benefit-Sharing Under the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’ 25 Italian Y.B. Int’l L. 113 (2015). 
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the limitation of international biodiversity law: in the absence of specific procedural guarantees and 
indications of the minimum level of protection, benefit-sharing could be used to impose certain views 
of development upon indigenous peoples and local communities that could endanger their cultural or 
physical survival. The main blindspot under the CBD is thus that the absence of procedural guarantees 
to ensure that benefit-sharing works towards its stated objectives. For instance, under the CBD, 
participation in decision-making is often seen as one of the possible benefits,94 blurring the line 
between required protection and matters up for contextual negotiations. Additionally, international 
biodiversity law is agnostic on the need to develop national legislation on benefit-sharing, which is 
instead increasingly emphasized under international human rights law as a precondition for avoiding 
human rights violations.95 In effect, it has been documented that indigenous peoples’ negotiating 
position in the context of contractual approaches to benefit-sharing is heavily affected by weak 
national legal frameworks on their rights.96  
  
 
2. Further developing a mutually supportive interpretation of fair and equitable benefit-
sharing 
 
One of the reasons for this incipient and one-sided cross-fertilization may be that benefit-sharing is 
framed97 differently under international human rights law and under the CBD, which may lead to 
conceptually different, but still potentially compatible, approaches in the two regimes. Under the 
CBD, legal developments on benefit-sharing have focused on equity considerations, out of concern 
for those communities that devote their efforts to, and bear the risks of, conservation and sustainable 
use, while the larger society benefits from these efforts without paying the costs associated with 
them.98 These considerations are generally left as assumptions underlying international biodiversity 
law, rather than issues directly addressed by it. International human rights lawyers, however, have 
been sceptical of perceived “unrealistic expectations regarding the conservationist behaviour of 
indigenous peoples [that] may have detrimental consequences for the recognition and respect of their 
rights.”99 Criticism has been voiced about opportunities under the CBD to condition the recognition 
or protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to their compatibility with environmental 
sustainability.100  
The CBD text arguably authorizes its Parties to depart from existing international human 
rights obligations in the exceptional cases in which their exercise would cause serious damage to or 
threaten biodiversity.101 Even in these cases, however, this should be understood as an obligation for 
CBD Parties to negotiate an interpretation of the CBD and other international instruments that leads 
to the identification of a mutually supportive solution with international human rights law.102 The 
latter understanding has been supported by the most recent case law of the Inter-American Court103 
recognizing the “right to dispose of natural resources should not be interpreted as a freedom to engage 
in unsustainable uses of the environment. Rather, this right must be understood in the context of 
                                               
94 The CBD work programme on protected areas, for instance, links the goal of promoting equity and benefit-sharing 
with engaging communities in participatory planning and governance: n 52, paras. 2(1)(3)-2(1)(5). 
95 Note reference to legislative, policy or administrative measures in the Nagoya Protocol, although in that context 
benefit-sharing is specifically related to bioprospecting. 
96 C O'Faircheallaigh & T Corbett, ‘Indigenous Participation in Environmental Management of Mining Projects: The 
Role of Negotiated Agreements’ (2015) 14 Envtl. Pol. 629, 635. 
97 Morgera (n 20), 356. 
98 Principles of the Ecosystem Approach (n 79), Principle 8. 
99 See Desmet (n 4), 41. 
100 Ibid, 131-132. 
101 CBD art 22(1). 
102 E Morgera, ‘Far Away, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the Increasing Interactions between the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law’ (2011) 2 Climate Law 85. 
103 Kaliña and Lokono, paras. 181 and 193. 
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common responsibilities for maintaining the health of our ecological systems”104 and in recognition 
of indigenous peoples as an “important part of the solution.”105 International human rights law has thus 
relied on the CBD as part of a wider normative framework that legitimizes the reconciliation of different 
interests protected internationally.106  
The full potential for a mutually supportive interpretation will be now explored by piecing 
together existing sources of authoritative interpretation that have not yet been drawn together by 
international human rights bodies but are implicitly compatible. First, the proposed interpretation will 
seek to clarify the procedural and substantive dimensions (fairness and equity) of benefit-sharing. It 
will then proceed to discuss the interplay of benefit-sharing with impact assessments and FPIC, 
arguing that benefit-sharing is intertwined with consent as an ongoing partnership-building process, 
and should be distinguished from compensation. The section will conclude with a reflection on the 
legal status of the international obligation to share benefits at the intersection of the two bodies of 
international law. 
 
2.1 Procedural dimensions 
 
Even in the face of the varying terminology used by different international human rights processes,107 
former UN Special Rapporteur James Anaya indicated that “the only clear international standard 
applicable to benefit-sharing [in relation to extractives and indigenous peoples] is that such sharing 
must be ‘fair and equitable’.”108 The focus on fairness and equity under the CBD, for its part, has 
remained quite inchoate. Fairness and equity in benefit-sharing are assumed, rather than supported 
by the development of international criteria or monitoring mechanisms. What fairness and equity 
mean is thus left to be determined through successive (often contractual) negotiations of benefit-
sharing agreements.109 In effect, case-by-case negotiations appear needed for a contextual 
operationalization of benefit-sharing under international biodiversity and human rights law, as they 
both refer (independently of each other) to “mutually agreed” benefits.110 Furthering a mutually 
supportive interpretation of fair and equitable benefit-sharing may thus serve also to set minimum 
parameters for fairness and equity under international biodiversity law by relying on international 
human rights law notions. This would be comparable to the evolution of the similarly worded notion 
                                               
104 M Fitzmaurice, ‘The Question of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: A Time for Reappraisal?’ in D French (ed.), Statehood 
And Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition And Modernity In International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
361; Desmet (n 4), 186-187; and S Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing 
Challenges’ (2011) 22 EJIL 121.  
105 J Ife, Human Rights from Below: Achieving Rights through Community Development 151 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). See also increasing references under the CBD to the “contribution of the collective action of indigenous 
peoples and local communities”: CBD COP Decision XIII/3, Strategic actions to enhance the implementation of the 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the achievement of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, including with respect 
to mainstreaming and the integration of biodiversity within and across sectors, paras 15, 18(b) and 98 (2016) and 
Decision XIII/ XIII/20. Resource mobilization (2016), paras 18-21 and Annex (‘Guiding principles on assessing the 
contribution of collective action by indigenous peoples and local communities’). 
106 R Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed for the WTO-and-
Competing-Regimes Debate?’ (2010) 21 EJIL 649, at 665. 
107 There is no such qualification for benefit-sharing in the text of ILO Convention No. 169. The CERD, UNPFII and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have referred to equitable benefit-sharing: CERD, Concluding Observations 
on Ecuador (n 48), para. 16 (2003); UNPFII, Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regard Free, Prior 
Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. E/C.19/2005/3, para. 46(i)(e) (2005); and Saramaka (Merits), 
para. 140 ("reasonable equitable") and Endorois, paras. 269 and 297. 
108 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/15/37 (n 29), paras. 67 and 76-78. 
109 F Francioni, ‘Equity’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2010, online ed), para. 25. 
110 Kaliña and Lokono, paras. 227-229 and 159. See A Lucas, ‘Participatory Rights and Strategic Litigation: Benefits 
Forcing and Endowment Protection in Canadian Natural Resource Development’ in L Barrera-Hernandez et al (eds), 
Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity (Oxford University Press, 2016) 339, at 342-345.  
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of fair and equitable treatment in international investment law,111 for which the meaning of ‘fair and 
equitable’ was not elaborated upon in the relevant treaties, and gradually fleshed out through 
international adjudication on the basis of human rights standards such as due process, non-
discrimination, and proportionality.112 
Along these lines, it can be argued that reference to ‘fair and equitable’ serves to make explicit 
both procedural (fairness) and substantive (equity) dimensions of justice.113 This argument can then 
be related to references in both international human rights and biodiversity sources (independently of 
each other) to the need for benefit-sharing to be endogenously identified and culturally appropriate.114 
In particular, the Inter-American Court has expressed the view that effective and appropriate 
measures to secure the use and enjoyment of traditional territories must accord with indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ cultural identity, economic and social characteristics, possible situation of 
vulnerability, customary laws and special relationship with the land.115 The UN Expert Mechanism 
on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights has confirmed that benefit-sharing is expected to accord with 
communities’ own understanding of benefits.116 The ILO monitoring bodies have emphasized that 
benefit-sharing should provide concrete expression of indigenous peoples’ accord on the basis of their 
values, customs and preferences.117 These references clearly point to the interactions of procedural 
and substantive dimensions, and seem to exclude unidirectional and/or top-down flows of benefits 
that would be externally imposed and unlikely to satisfy the standard of cultural appropriateness. 
Rather endogenous identification reinforces the view that benefit-sharing is about supporting 
community agency118 and indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.119 
The argument put forward here is that sparse interpretative guidance in international 
biodiversity and human rights instruments seem to indicate that the procedural dimension of benefit-
sharing is a concerted and dialogic process aimed at developing a genuine partnership between 
communities and other (generally more powerful) actors based on a common understanding across 
different worldviews of what economic and non-economic benefits are at stake and how they should 
be shared. This presupposes an understanding of benefit-sharing as an iterative process, rather than a 
one-off exercise, of good-faith engagement120 providing “elements of confidence-building conducive 
to consensus.”121 Such an approach would provide an opportunity to develop a shared development 
vision on the basis of respect for each parties’ views and mutual openness to persuasion.122 In 
addition, it needs to factor in communities’ evolving perceptions and understanding of benefits over 
                                               
111 The suggestion to draw on the evolution of fair and equitable treatment to better understand fair and equitable benefit 
sharing was put forward by F Francioni, ‘International Law for Biotechnology: Basic Principles’, in F Francioni and T 
Scovazzi (eds), Biotechnology and International Law (2006) 3, at 24. 
112 PM Dupuy and J Viñuales, ‘Human Rights and Investment Disciplines: Integration in Progress’, in M Bungenberg et 
al. (eds), International Investment Law: A Handbook (2015) 1739. 
113 See generally T Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), and reflections by R Klager, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 2013), at 141–152. 
114 Saramaka (Interpretation), paras. 25-2; CBD, Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem Approach (n 79), paras 
1(8), 2(1); CBD, Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage of 
Indigenous and Local Communities, CBD Decision X/42 (2010), para. 14. 
115 Kaliña and Lokono, para. 251(4). 
116 UN Expert Mechanism (n 5), para. 39(h); also Special Rapporteur Anaya, Report to the General Assembly, UN Doc. 
A/67/301, para. 78 (2012). 
117 ILO, Observation (Norway) (n 30), 95. 
118 Morgera (n 20), 363-364 and Mancisidor (n 26). 
119 Saramaka (Interpretation), paras. 25-2; CBD, Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem Approach (n 79), paras 
1(8), 2(1); CBD, Tkarihwaié:ri Code (n 114), para. 14. 
120 Morgera (n 20), 363-364. 
121 Special Rapporteur Anaya, Report on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, para. 53 (2009); and Special Rapporteur Anaya, Study on Extractive Industries and Indigenous 
Peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/24/41, para. 88 (2013). 
122 N Craik, ‘Process and Reconciliation: Integrating the Duty to Consult with Environmental Assessment’ (2016) 52 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, 42 and 48. 
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time.123 To sum, up, and as agreed upon under the CBD, respectful and enduring partnership-building 
“means a continual process of building mutually beneficial, ongoing arrangements ... in order to build 
trust, good relations, mutual understanding, intercultural spaces, knowledge exchanges, and to create 
new knowledge and reconciliation.”124 These are key considerations that can underpin the minimum 
procedural guarantees spelled out under international human rights law.125 
 
2.2 Substantive dimensions 
International sources have shied away from elucidating clearly and explicitly the substantive content 
of benefit-sharing. Scarce interpretative guidance can be pieced together, however, on the basis of 
legal theory on equity in international law, the interpretation of the right to development offered by 
the African Commission and the menu of benefits identified under the CBD. 
Legal theory has identified two substantive dimensions of equity in international law. First, 
no participant can make claims that automatically prevail over the claims made by other 
participants.126 In the specific case of fair and equitable benefit-sharing, this means excluding an 
overriding presumption in favour of State sovereignty over natural resources.127 This argument finds 
resonance in the references in international human rights materials to the need to establish a genuine 
partnership through benefit-sharing. Accordingly, notwithstanding different power relations, actors 
should treat each other as equal128 to accommodate State sovereignty over natural sovereignty (and 
the interests of the entire population over natural resources), on the one hand, and indigenous peoples’ 
self-determination or local communities’ self-governance129 of the relationship with their land upon 
which their physical and cultural survival130 depends.  
The second substantive dimension of equity, according to theories of international law, is that 
inequalities in substantive outcomes are only justifiable if they provide advantages to all 
participants.131 This argument can in turn be related to the references in human rights jurisprudence 
on benefit-sharing to the concept of reasonableness132 with respect to the need to balance the 
protection of the traditional way of life of indigenous peoples that is intimately intertwined with and 
dependent on natural resources.133 Regional human rights jurisprudence has indicated that benefit-
sharing from natural resource exploitation should be in accordance with communities’ determinations 
based on their customs and traditions, while taking into account proportionality vis-à-vis the public 
                                               
123 P Keenan, ‘Business, Human Rights, and Communities: The Problem of Community Contest in Development’, 
Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 14-18 (2013), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353493. 
124 CBD Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines (n 75), para 23(a) and 8. 
125 See section 1.1. above. 
126 Klager, (n 113), 163. 
127 C Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention 250 (Hart Publishing, 2014). 
128 E.g., Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/12/34 (n 121), paras. 51 and 53; UNDRIP prembular para. 25 (and H 
Quane, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: New Directions for Self-Determination and 
Participatory Rights?’ in Allen and Xanthaki (n 9) 259, 270 and 276-77); UN Expert Mechanism (n 5), Annex, para. 28; 
and Report of the High-level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development on its Second Meeting, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.18/TF/3, para. 82 (2005). 
129 Fitzmaurice (n 104), 375; and Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/12/34 (n 121), paras. 53 and 43(b). 
130 Saramaka (Interpretation), para. 2  
131 Klager (n 113), 145. 
132 O Corten, ‘Reasonableness in International Law’ in Wolfrum (n 109). See also Reports of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for the Forty-Second and Forty-Third sessions, Consideration of reports of States 
parties: Cambodia, UN Doc. E/C.12/2009/3, para. 193 (2009), and for the Forty-Second and Forty-Third sessions, 
Consideration of reports of States parties: Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc. E/C.12/2009/3, para. 289 (2009); 
OHCHR, Mapping Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable 
Environment: Individual Report on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2013), para. 
48 (2013) and Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (n 47), paras. 45-46; and 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
Programme on Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, part I, para. 20 (1993). 
133 Endorois, para. 15. 
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interest, including environmental protection.134 In the case of conservation measures, in particular, 
the Inter-American Court has indicated that it may be “reasonable” for the State to retain supervision, 
access and management of areas of general and strategic interest and for safety reasons.135 The same 
concerns appear implicitly reflected in CBD guidance related to the respect of communities’ customary 
laws and practices136 and benefits in the form of co-management of natural resources.137 The 
proportionality test, however, according to Århén, should not to be conceived merely according to 
the understanding of the majority of the population (likely influenced by market value) but also in 
terms of indigenous understanding of its cultural and spiritual value, to avoid discrimination against 
different worldviews.138 
These considerations will now be related to guidance on benefit-sharing provided by the 
African Commission. The Endorois decision is the only international material that focuses on the 
substantive dimensions of benefit-sharing in relation to the right to development.139 The Commission 
clarified the substantive core of benefit-sharing as a matter of choice and increased capabilities,140 
resulting in indigenous and tribal peoples’ improved well-being141 and empowerment.142 Arguably 
Special Rapporteur Anaya shed light in a similar way on the substantive elements of benefit-sharing, 
when he referred to empowerment both in procedural and substantive terms.143 This line of reasoning, 
in as far as it is based on global human rights instruments,144 can be relevant under other regional 
regimes145 and globally.146  
The African Commission, however, did not elaborate on how the substantive dimensions of 
benefit-sharing could be realized.147 The argument put forward here is that choice and capabilities 
find resonance in the range of monetary and non-monetary benefits that have been identified under 
the CBD. Choice can be realized through those benefits that provide or enhance “resource control” - 
                                               
134 IACtHR, Comunidad Garífuna de Punta Piedra y sus miembros vs Honduras (Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs), 8 October 2015, para. 215; Kaliña and Lokono, para. 168. 
135 Kaliña and Lokono, para. 191. 
136 Gibson (n 80), 450. 
137 CBD work programme on protected areas (n 52), para 19; Addis Ababa Guidelines (n 56), practical principle 12, 
operational guidelines. 
138 Endorois, para. 212. Århén (n 5), at 207-212. 
139 Endorois, para. 294-298. The right to development is explicitly protected under the African Charter (art. 22), and is 
understood as an expression of the right to self-determination of indigenous and tribal peoples comprising a distinctive 
bundle of rights to participation, culture and natural resources: see Pentassuglia (n 38), 157, and generally and C Doyle 
& J Gilbert, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: From “Development Aggression” to “Self-Determined 
Development”’ (2008/9) 7 Eur. Y.B. Minority Issues 219. 
140 Endorois, para. 279. C Morel, ‘From Theory to Practice: Holistic Strategies for Effective Advocacy’ in Lennox and 
Short (n 17) 355, 359. S Coulthard, J. McGregor and C White, ‘Multiple Dimensions of Wellbeing in Practice’ in 
Schreckenberg et al (n 87) 243. 
141 J Castellino, ‘Indigenous Rights and the Right to Development: Emerging Synergies or Collusion?’ in Allen and 
Xanthaki (n 9) 367, 369 fn 8. On wellbeing as the substantive aim of benefit-sharing, see also Report of the Special 
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights: The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/20/26, para. 22 (2012); and ILO Conference 87th Session 1999, Report III (Part 1a), 434. 
142 Endorois, para. 283, as well as paras. 127-129 and 135. See, however, words of caution again understanding of 
wellbeing in economic and spatial terms, rather than cultural terms, by Thornberry (n 41), 298. 
143 A/HRC/24/41 (n 121), paras. 75 and 59.  
144 Endorois, paras. 294 and 296; CERD, General Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/52/18, 
annex V, para. 4 (1997); CERD, Concluding Observations on Ecuador, UN Doc. A/58/18, para. 62 (2003). 
145 M Orellana, ‘Saramaka People v Suriname Judgment’ (2008) 102 AJIL 841, 846. Although note limited cross-
fertilization between the Inter-American and European courts of human rights: see generally R Pavoni, ‘Environmental 
Jurisprudence of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights: Comparative Insights’ in B Boer (ed), 
Environmental Law Dimensions of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015) 69, 105. 
146 On the “glocalization” of right to development, see R Stavenhagen, ‘Making the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Work: The Challenge Ahead’ in Allen and Xanthaki (n 9) 147, 152-153. See also Pentassuglia (n 
18), 201. 
147 K Sing' Oei & J Shepherd, ‘In Land We Trust’: The Endorois' Communication and the Quest for Indigenous Peoples' 
Rights in Africa’ (2010) 16 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 57, 108-109. 
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the realization of communities’ worldview of their resources.148 Control-benefits can thus take the 
form of community-based management of natural resources, joint ventures when the skills or 
technology of external actors may be needed, but also the incorporation of traditional knowledge in 
environmental and socio-cultural impact assessments and in natural resource management planning, 
and, under certain conditions, the allocation of employment opportunities in the natural resource 
sector to communities. Capabilities as the distribution of opportunities for individuals and groups to 
freely pursue their chosen way of life and wellbeing,149 find specific reflection in support-benefits 
identified under the CBD. These include support for the economic activities of indigenous peoples 
and local communities, through direct investment opportunities, access to markets, and 
diversification of income-generating (economic) opportunities, or capacity building and technical 
support. This proposed distinction between benefits fundamentally geared to protect or enhance 
communities’ control over natural resources (and thereby enhancing choice).  
This could also address possibly redress of past injustices, and benefits providing support (and 
thereby enhancing capabilities) for the exercise of effective control, is not explicitly discussed under 
the CBD. The corollary to the argument proposed here is that both types of benefits are essential. On 
the one hand, support-benefits are extremely significant in their own right to prevent further 
marginalization of community voices due to the intricate nature of environmental management 
processes in which their views and preferences are to be integrated.150 For instance, communities may 
be legally recognised full management of an area, but not supported in complying with highly 
technical aspects of applicable legislation, such as plant health requirements. On the other hand, the 
absence of an explicit discussion of such distinction under the CBD carries the risk that support-
benefits may be offered as an alternative, rather than as a complement, to control-benefits: for 
instance, communities may be offered employment opportunities, but not a seat at the decision-
making table of a forestry project or protected area.151  
A fully-fledged mutually supportive interpretation could guide the identification of 
appropriate benefits in a particular context by recognizing the need for both control-benefits and 
support-benefits in realizing the objective of furthering communities’ own development priorities152 
and the full realization of their human rights as a form of reasonable partnership. 
 
 
2.3 Benefit-sharing and impact assessment 
 
International human rights processes have been quite consistent in establishing that prior, 
comprehensive environmental and socio-cultural impact assessments be carried out as a safeguard 
for indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights over their natural resources. This section explores how a 
mutually supportive interpretation of international biodiversity and human rights standards can clarify 
the interplay between benefit-sharing and impact assessments. The proposed interpretation 
illuminates opportunities to engender a proactive approach to the protection and realization of human 
rights by supporting understanding of different worldviews. The proposed interpretation builds upon 
a detailed interrogation of the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines, and is informed by a consideration of 
                                               
148 For their own primary benefit, including in terms of environmental sustainability, albeit without excluding 
opportunities for benefits to others according to views of broader society: see generally Y Omorogbe, ‘Resource 
Control and Benefit-sharing in Nigeria’ in Barrera-Hernandez et al (n 110).  
149 Eg generally M Nussbaum & A Sen, The Quality of Life (Clarendon Press, 1993).  
150 Shelton (n 74), 554. 
151 Note the mixed picture arising in this regard from benefit-sharing as part of community-based wildlife management 
initiatives in Africa. F Nelson, ‘Introduction’ in F Nelson (ed.), Community Rights, Conservation and Contested Lands: 
The Politics of Natural Resource Governance in Africa (Earthscan, 2010) 3, 4 and 11.  
152 Special Rapporteur on the human rights obligations related to environmentally sound management and disposal of 
hazardous substances and waste, Report, (2012) UN Doc. A/HRC/21/48, paras. 36 and 69(h). 
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well-known implementation challenges in the environmental field, and of the status, justiciability and 
minimum content of impact assessment obligations under general international law. 
Impact assessments are generally understood as geared towards damage prevention or 
damage control, including as a way to provide information necessary for indigenous peoples to decide 
whether to provide FPIC or not.153 For instance, the Inter-American Court has consistently indicated 
that these assessments should aim at ensuring that permitted levels of impact do not negate the 
survival of the members of indigenous peoples, and that indigenous peoples are aware of possible 
risks, including environmental and health ones, so that they can weigh up whether to accept proposed 
developments voluntarily and with full knowledge.154 A mutually supportive interpretation, instead, 
unveils the potential of the early consideration of culturally appropriate and endogenously defined benefit-
sharing options are part of impact assessment expands the scope and approach of the latter quite 
significantly. The CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines specifically clarify that impact assessments should 
identify, in an integrated fashion – that is, at least potentially in accordance with holistic worldviews 
– environmental, economic and socio-cultural benefits,155 in addition to potential damage to ways of 
life, livelihoods, well-being, and traditional knowledge.156 In supporting FPIC processes,157 the CBD 
Akwé: Kon Guidelines require that consideration of benefit-sharing starts significantly early on in 
the process – as early as the screening and scoping phases of assessments.158 As a result, the Akwé: 
Kon Guidelines move away from a damage-control approach, shifting to collaboratively identifying 
and understanding also opportunities for positive impacts according to indigenous peoples’ and local 
communities’ worldviews159 to determine the scope of the assessment.  
The Akwé: Kon Guidelines, furthermore, arguably move away from a technocratic exercise, 
calling for collaborative procedures and methodologies aimed at ensuring the full involvement of 
indigenous peoples and local communities. As it has been poignantly remarked, the general 
effectiveness of environmental assessments “as procedural measures generating environmentally 
sound and just outcomes in socio-ecological systems characterized by uncertainty and normative 
disagreement” remains “an open question, notwithstanding over forty years of practice across the 
globe.”160 In particular, while participation of potentially affected stakeholders is a widely accepted 
and essential element of environmental assessment,161 the actual suitability of this tool and of settled 
assessment practices in different countries to effectively and respectfully integrate traditional 
knowledge with “scientific knowledge,”162 remains to be explored. In addition, evidence confirms 
that EIAs may not provide a culturally appropriate and open space for understanding the worldviews 
of indigenous peoples, due to embedded tendencies in EIA practice to privilege mainstream views of 
development. This may explain indigenous peoples’ preference for indigenous assessments that are 
fully based on indigenous laws and legal traditions.163 
                                               
153 N Craik, ‘Biodiversity-inclusive Impact Assessment’ in Morgera and Razzaque (n 79) 431, argues that consideration 
of biodiversity concerns more generally expands the range of issues and values to be included in environmental 
assessments. See also C Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and Resources: The Transformative Role 
of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (Routledge, 2015), 94. 
154 Saramaka (Merits), para. 133; Kichwa, para. 205; Kaliña and Lokono, para. 214. 
155 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 52), para. 23. 
156 Ibid, para. 36. 
157 Ibid, paras. 8(e) and 53. 
158 Ibid, Forward, and para. 3, and 13-14. 
159 Ibid, para. 37. 
160 See Craik (n 153) 443. 
161 Rio Principles 10 and 22; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities, (2001) UN Doc A/56/1, Ch 5.E, art 13; Independent Expert Knox, Mapping Report (n 40). 
162 S Vermeylen et al, ‘Intellectual Property, Rights Systems and the Assemblage of Local Knowledge Systems’ (2008) 
15 Int’l J. Cultural Prop. 201. 
163 N Schabus, ‘Traditional Knowledge’ in Morgera and Razzaque (n 79), 264. 
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Consequently, according to the Akwé: Kon Guidelines, the breadth of the assessment ranges 
from cultural elements such as belief systems, languages and customs,164 to systems of natural 
resource use, the maintenance of genetic diversity through indigenous customary management, the 
exercise of customary laws regarding land tenure and distribution of resources and benefits,165 food 
and health,166 community well-being, vitality and viability (employment levels and opportunities, 
welfare, education, and availability and standards of housing, infrastructure, services),167 as well as 
transgenerational aspects, such as opportunities for elders to pass on their knowledge to youth.168 
Governments are also expected to take into account indigenous peoples and local communities’ rights 
over lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by them and associated biodiversity.169 The 
Akwé: Kon Guidelines further call for caution on the risks of elite capture170 associated with benefit-
sharing: they draw attention to the “affected community and its people as a whole” so as to ensure 
that “particular individuals or groups are not unjustly advantaged or disadvantaged to the detriment 
of the community as a result of the development.”171 Overall, the range of considerations to be 
integrated in otherwise technical, information-focused assessment exercises emerge as an essential 
pre-condition to realize the transformational potential of impact assessments to develop a shared 
development vision informed by communities’ worldviews.172 
As Craik has pointed out, the analysis of alternatives in environmental assessments is essential 
to demonstrate good faith and the meaningful character of consultations in the absence of clear 
quantitative standards to assess the acceptability of impacts.173 Authorities must demonstrate that 
mitigation measures, at a minimum, correspond to the preferred alternatives put forward by 
indigenous peoples or local communities, including when it is an alternative to the project, rather than 
just alternative means of carrying out the proposed project. Should a different alternative be chosen, 
authorities’ justification also needs to take into account indigenous peoples’ views.174  
The practical relevance of a mutually supportive interpretation of environmental assessment 
obligations rests not only on the broad intergovernmental support for the CBD Guidelines, but also 
on the lessons learnt in the environmental domain with regard to the transformative potential of 
environmental assessments and the challenges to its realization. Different national frameworks on 
environmental assessments may be more or less suited to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and 
local communities, as the balancing of different interests may depend on whether constitutional 
protection is afforded to indigenous rights and/or to the general interest in environmental 
protection.175 While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) left the determination of the precise 
requirements of an EIA to the State’s discretion,176 it has been argued that at least two components 
of impact assessments are required by general international law – cumulative impact assessments and 
post-project monitoring.177 Both can have an important role to play in the protection and realization 
                                               
164 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 52), para 6(f). 
165 Ibid, paras 24 and 27-28, 34. 
166 Ibid, para. 42. 
167 Ibid, para. 6(d). 
168 Ibid, para. 49. 
169 Ibid, para. 57. 
170 Keenan (n 123). 
171 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 52), para. 51. 
172 On such a transformational potential of impact assessment, see generally Craik (n 122). 
173 N Craik, H Gardner and D McCarthy, ‘Indigenous – Corporate Private Governance and Legitimacy: Lessons 
Learned from Impact and Benefit Agreements’ (2017) 52  Resources Policy 379. 
174 Ibid. 
175 See generally Craik et al (n 173); and also Desmet (n 4), 186-187. Note, however, Birnie et al (n 74), 287. 
176 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), ICJ 20 April 2010, para. 205. 
177 N Craik, ‘Principle 17: Environmental Impact Assessment’ in Viñuales (n 74) 451, 460. 
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of indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ natural resource-related rights,178 in particular with 
regard to an iterative process of identification and sharing of benefits, as the understanding of impacts 
evolve. For instance, a benefit-sharing arrangement in the context of the cultivation of a unique 
variety of rice may initially revolve around production sharing between the community that has been 
the custodian of this variety and of the lands where it is traditionally cultivated and a State-subsidized 
company that conducts agricultural activities to relieve aging or otherwise economically active 
members of the community. Over time, however, the community may realize that creating seed 
nurseries and avoiding the use of chemicals that may damage other traditional land uses is equally 
significant for the partnership than production sharing. 
Finally, the prevailing practice in project-level environmental assessments does not include 
consideration of relevant historical context179 and land claims, and is less likely to address long-term 
implications of resource development on community interests. International environmental law rather 
has recourse to strategic environmental assessments, at the level of policies, plans, and programmes, 
to take into account cumulative impacts. Human rights bodies should therefore give consideration, in 
order to support consideration of communities’ broader territorial and historical perspectives,180 to 
States’ obligations to carry out strategic environmental assessments, which is not a common 
requirement outside of Europe,181 even if it is a general requirement in international law182 and 
consensus guidance has been developed under the CBD.183  
 
2.4 Benefit-sharing and FPIC 
 
This section further develops a mutually supportive interpretation of benefit-sharing as intertwined 
with FPIC, rather than as a subsequent step to FPIC. The discussion serves to identify areas of overlap 
between FPIC and benefit-sharing as iterative dialogic processes that are aimed not only at the 
protection, but also at the realization of indigenous peoples’ rights over natural resources. In other 
words, a more developed mutually supportive interpretation helps move away from conceptualizing 
FPIC and benefit-sharing merely as safeguards, so as to consider them proactive tools for the full 
realization of indigenous peoples’ rights. In addition, this section explores the contribution of CBD 
materials to the elucidation of the procedural and substantive content of FPIC, and the contribution 
of international human rights law to the identification of additional guarantees required for FPIC and 
benefit-sharing. Ultimately, the discussion serves to clarify that lack of fair and equitable benefit-
sharing can provide legitimate grounds to withhold or withdraw consent. 
Although it is commonly considered a relatively recent international legal concept,184 prior 
informed consent has originated in indigenous peoples’ own legal traditions and relations with other 
peoples.185 In the context of international human rights processes, FPIC has been interpreted as 
entailing that consent should be given freely, without coercion, intimidation or manipulation. States 
are to allow sufficient time for internal discussion within the community,186 seeking FPIC whenever 
                                               
178 M Barelli, 'Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead' (2012) 16 Int'l J. Hum. Rts. 1, 15. See, eg, HRC, Jouni E. Länsman et 
al. v. Finland, Communication No. 671/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (1996), para 10.7. 
179 S Vermeylen, “Benefit-sharing, Justice and the Global South” BENELEX blog post (April 2016). 
180 See generally Craik et al (n 173). 
181 Craik (n 153) 437-438. 
182 N 177. 
183 CBD art 14(2). 
184 E.g. UN Expert Mechanism, Final report of the study on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-
making, UN Doc A/HRC/18/42, 2011, para. 63, criticized by Doyle (n 153), 5. 
185 See generally Doyle (n 153). 
186 Kichwa, para. 180. 
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there is a possible impact on traditional life187 at all stages of development projects or conservation 
initiatives (from inception to final authorization and implementation).188 State obligations thus 
include to create channels for sustained, effective and reliable dialogue with indigenous peoples’ 
representative institutions.189  
FPIC encounters varied degrees of recognition or commitment among States.190 Under the 
CBD, while the Akwé: Kon Guidelines refer to “prior informed consent,”191 more recent 
instruments192 refer to “prior informed consent or approval and involvement” reflecting the reluctance 
by some CBD Parties to fully endorse the standards enshrined in UNDRIP. According to proponent 
countries, the expression “approval and involvement” was introduced in order to allow for a greater 
degree of flexibility in implementation at the national level,193 in the light of different domestic legal 
arrangements concerning the relations between governments and indigenous peoples within their 
territories.194 It can be hypothesized that these differences mainly concern the ways and degree to 
which the FPIC process is determined and controlled by indigenous communities.195 Several 
commentators have suggested that CBD Parties can consider the two expressions as having 
essentially the same meaning in practice,196 that is effectively empowering communities to genuinely 
influence decisions that affect their interests,197 not merely a right to be involved in such processes.198 
In effect, the dividing line between the general principle of international law on effective 
consultation and FPIC obligations is not clear-cut. The Inter-American Court emphasized the need 
for “special and differentiated” consultation processes when the interests of indigenous and tribal 
peoples may be affected,199 with the public interest test set at a higher threshold because their physical 
and cultural survival is at stake.200 In other words, FPIC goes beyond a more general right to 
consultation with the public, as a matter of intensity of the duty.201 FPIC should arguably guarantee 
                                               
187 Kaliña and Lokono, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Sierra Porto and Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, paras. 14; 
UNPFII, Report on the tenth session, UN Doc E/2011/43-E/C.19/2011/14, paras. 34-38 (2011), particularly para. 34. 
188 Kaliña and Lokono, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Sierra Porto and Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, para. 14. 
189 Kichwa, paras. 166 and 177; Endorois, para. 289; Kaliña and Lokono, Joint Concurring Opinion of Antonio Sierra 
Porto and Mac-Gregor Poisot, para. 15. 
190 Gilbert & Doyle (n 9), 325. 
191 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 52, paras. 29, 52-53 and 60) refer consistently only to ‘prior informed consent’. 
192 Nagoya Protocol art 6(2), with “approval and involvement” being found in the wording of CBD art 8(j); Bonn 
Guidelines (n 89), para. 31; and CBD Decision V/16, para. 5. For an indication of continued diverge of views on 
utilising UNDRIP language in the context of the CBD, see C Benson et al, Summary of the Seventh Meeting of the 
Working Group on Article 8(j), 9:557 ENB (2011) 5-6; and B Antonich et al, Summary of the Eighth Meeting of the 
Working Group on Article 8(j) and 17th Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological 
Advice of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 9:611 ENB (2013), 4, 6-7 and 20. 
193 G Burton, ‘Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in JUSCANZ Countries: The Unlikely Lot’ in Morgera et al (eds), 
The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and 
Implementation Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 295, 318, particularly 318-319.  
194 “Joint submission Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee),” 133-136, and comments by A Savaresi, ‘The 
International Human Rights Law Implications of the Nagoya Protocol’ in Morgera et al (n 193) 53, 69; Special Rapporteur 
Anaya, A/67/301 (n 116), paras. 58-59. 
195 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/24/41 (n 121), paras. 26-36. 
196 Eg S Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol On Access And Benefit Sharing: An Analysis, (2011); and Special Rapporteur Anaya, 
A/67/301 (n 116), paras. 92 and 61, where the Special Rapporteur specifically expresses the ‘hopeful expectation’ that 
the provisions of the Nagoya Protocol will be implemented ‘in harmony with’ UNDRIP. 
197 Doyle (n 153), 154; Thornberry (n 41), 349. 
198 Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Advice No. 2, Indigenous peoples and the right to participate 
in decision-making, (2011), para. 1, emphasis added. Århén (n 5), 141. 
199 Kichwa, paras. 165-166. 
200 Endorois, para. 212. Compare with K Gover, ‘Settler-State Political Theory, ‘CANZUS’ and the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2015) 26 Eur. J. Int’l L. 345, 372. 
201 See contra, the argument that the right to consultation is procedural, whereas FPIC as a core element of the internal 
aspect of the right to self-determination is substantive (the right to effectively determine the material outcome of 
decision-making process): see Århén (n 5), 135-138. The present author is rather persuaded that procedural and 
substantive dimensions are intertwined in consultation as well as in FPIC, impact assessment and benefit-sharing. 
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a “distinguishable voice” for indigenous and tribal peoples within a pluralistic and democratic society 
in light of their right to decide their own development priorities.202 Other international legal materials 
have recognized FPIC as part of the human rights of non-indigenous communities.203 
A key question regards the need to ensure that consent is given by the legitimate 
representatives of the peoples or communities concerned. International human rights materials 
emphasize the need to take into account indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ “self-chosen 
and autonomously managed”204 decision-making mechanisms,205 although FPIC “does not 
necessarily require unanimity and may be achieved even when individuals or groups within the 
community explicitly disagree.”206 Accordingly, States are responsible to ensure the genuine 
involvement of legitimate representatives of indigenous peoples and the true nature of consent in the 
context of customary institutions, taking into account that consent may be withdrawn at a later 
stage.207  
Consensus guidance under the CBD have provided further insights on the “prior” and “free” 
components of FPIC as a continual process building mutually beneficial, ongoing arrangements208 
that should be free from “expectations or timelines that are externally imposed.”209 This formulation 
provides for an additional layer of protection to the western notion of consent as merely devoid of 
more obvious forms of pressure, such as coercion and intimidation, and benefitted from indigenous 
representatives’ inputs into intergovernmental negotiations.210 In addition, this formulation fleshes 
out the characterization of FPIC as a “constant process of dialogue” advanced in the Inter-American 
context,211 and resonates with the description of benefit-sharing as an interactive process. Because of 
these shared procedural characteristics and the substantive connection between the objectives of FPIC 
and a culturally appropriate and endogenously identified benefit-sharing, the two should be seen as 
intertwined, rather than successive elements of human rights related to natural resources.212 
With regard to the “informed” dimension of FPIC, international human rights bodies have 
also clarified that FPIC should be based on an understanding of the full range of issues and 
implications entailed by the activity or decision in question. As discussed above, the relationship 
between FPIC and impact assessment has been explored by human rights bodies with a view to 
providing indigenous peoples with “full and objective information about all aspects of the project that 
will affect them, including the impact of the project on their lives and environment”.213 As highlighted 
with regard to the interface between impact assessment and benefit-sharing, the assessment needs to 
focus not only on negative impacts but also on positive ones, that have been identified by indigenous 
peoples and local communities according to their worldviews. Thus, the interplay between impact 
assessments and benefit-sharing appears as an essential precondition for FPIC to serve not only as a 
tool to prevent unwanted development, but also to ensure that “indigenous peoples shape 
                                               
202 In light of ILO Convention 169, Article art 7(1): A Fuentes, ‘Judicial Interpretation and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
to Lands, Participation and Consultation. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Approach’ (2015) 23 Int’l J. 
Minority & Group Rts 39, 74-76 and 79. 
203 Eg Special Rapporteur De Schutter, Interim Report, UN Doc. A/67/268, para. 39 (2012); ECOWAS, Directive on the 
Harmonization of Guiding Principles and Policies in the mining Sector (2009); UN-REDD Programme, “Guidelines on 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent” (2013), 11-12; Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels, Principles and Criteria (2012): 
Morgera et al (n 77), 40; and L Cotula and K Tienhaara, ‘Reconfiguring Investment Contracts to Promote Sustainable 
Development’ (2013) 2011-2012 Y.B. Int’l L. Inv. & Pol’y 281, 301 and 303. 
204 Doyle (n 154), 16. 
205 Ibid, 154; see Thornberry (n 41), 349. 
206 UNGA Res 17/4, para. 11 (2011). 
207 Ibid. 
208 CBD, Mo’otz Kuxtal guidelines (n 75), para. 6. 
209 Ibid, para 14. 
210 See generally Morgera (n 76). 
211 Kaliña and Lokono, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Sierra Porto and Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot. 
212 N 124 above. 
213 See Saramaka (Merits), para. 134; and Fodella (n 23), 356 and 360. 
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developments by and for themselves,”214 providing “the foundations for the emergence of a new 
resource governance model” premised on the notion of partnership.215  
In addition, international law provides limited guidance on when the will of States should not 
prevail over that of indigenous and tribal peoples in case of lack of agreement.216 So, how to reconcile 
self-determination that applies to the whole State populations with self-determination of indigenous 
peoples,217 neither of which is absolute?218 This boils down to the right of saying “no” by indigenous 
peoples, in consideration of other human rights at stake of the larger population. To some extent, this 
can be explained by the need to address these questions in a specific context. But it has led to the 
thorny question of whether FPIC provides an absolute veto power to right-holding communities.219 
Several international human rights bodies have excluded that FPIC requires necessarily agreement 
by indigenous peoples in all circumstances, although consultations should be carried out in good faith 
and in a form appropriate to the circumstances with the objective of achieving agreement.220 Every 
effort is expected to be made to build consensus on the part of all concerned in reaching an agreement 
(including on benefit-sharing) that is seen as legitimate by the community,221 in line with customary 
legal traditions.222 Particular difficulties arise in situations where ownership over natural resources is 
not clarified in domestic frameworks, or when consultations with communities in this regard are 
inconclusive. 
On the basis of the interface between impact assessment, FPIC and benefit-sharing in relation 
to indigenous peoples’ rights to natural resources, the argument is put forward here that indigenous 
and tribal peoples, and possibly other communities, should be legitimately entitled to say “no” to 
proposed extractive operations or the creation of protected areas in the following circumstances. First, 
if the proposed activity is likely to affect traditionally owned or used resources, or has the potential 
to negatively impact on traditionally used resources threatening the community’s cultural and 
physical survival.223 Second, if an early, genuine and culturally appropriate identification and 
discussion of benefits according to their worldviews has not been undertaken at all; or has not had 
any impact on the final outcome, in the absence of sufficient reasons to justify such an outcome. 
Without early and genuine discussion of benefit-sharing, the State would not be able to prove that the 
decision is “consistent with the full range of applicable international norms,”224 when communities’ 
culture, society and way of life are at stake.225  
 
 
2.5 Benefit-sharing and compensation 
 
As discussed above, under the CBD benefit-sharing has been interpreted as a reward and incentive 
                                               
214 Doyle (n 153), 131. 
215 See generally Doyle (n 153) and V Tauli-Corpuz, “The Concept of Indigenous Peoples’ Self-Determined 
Development or Development with Identity and Culture: Challenges and Trajectories”, UN Doc. 
CLT/CPD/CPO/2008/IPS/02, 2008 
216 Århén (n 5), 225. 
217 Gilbert & Doyle (n 9), 313-15 and Tauli-Corpuz (n 215).  
218 Århén (n 5), 138. 
219 UN Expert Mechanism, Advice No 2 (n 198), para 23. Gilbert & Doyle (n 9), 316; Thornberry (n 41), 217 and 349; 
Doyle (n 154), 98-99; and M Barelli, ‘Development Projects and Indigenous Peoples’ Land: Defining the Scope of 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ in Lennox and Short (n 17) 69, 75. 
220 Endorois, para. 289; Anaya A/HRC/12/34 (n 121), para 46. On the lack of a unified approach to FPIC at the 
international level, see Barelli (n 219), 75. 
221 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/12/34 (n 121), para. 53. 
222 Which are considered premised on principles of good faith, justice, friendship and solidarity, as a notion that affirms 
and protects the rights of both parties and clarify their duties towards one another: Doyle (n 153), 41. 
223 Ibid, at 8. See also ILA, Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2010).  
224 J Anaya, Indigenous Peoples In International Law (OUP, 2004), 155. 
225 Århén (n 5), 139. 
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for the good management practices of indigenous peoples and local communities that are responsible 
for the production and sustainable management of ecosystem functions.226 Occasional references to 
indigenous peoples’ ecosystem stewardship can also be found in international human rights law 
materials.227 But principally, under international human rights law, benefit-sharing has been 
conceptualized as a form of compensation.228 This may be a consequence of the emphasis on damage 
prevention and control in impact assessments, and on financial payments in benefit-sharing 
agreements. Nevertheless, the Inter-American Court’s reliance on benefit-sharing has been 
considered “promising” in increasingly focusing on indigenous peoples’ preferences, being deployed 
in accordance with their modes of governance, and empowering victims, while being more efficient 
and less expensive in its non-monetary form.229 This section discusses how a fully-fledged mutually 
supportive interpretation may serve to clarify that fair and equitable benefit-sharing differs from 
reparations from a legal perspective, despite any overlap in practice in supporting the realization of 
communities’ worldviews. It also points to practical difficulties in implementation. 
At present, there has not been a jurisprudential clarification of the distinction between benefit-
sharing and compensation. The Inter-American Court explained the emergence of benefit-sharing as 
“inherent to the right of compensation”230 for the “deprivation of the regular use of the enjoyment” 
of traditionally owned natural resources.231 The African Commission adopted the same reasoning.232 
Former UN Special Rapporteur Anaya stated that the duty to share benefits is “independent of 
compensation measures,” although it “responds in part to the concept of fair compensation for 
deprivation or limitation of the rights of the communities concerned, in particular their right of 
communal ownership of lands, territories and natural resources.” 233 The point was further blurred in 
a subsequent report. Anaya noted that “direct financial benefits – beyond incidental benefits like jobs 
or corporate charity – should accrue to indigenous peoples because of the compensation that is due 
to them for allowing access to their territories, for giving up alternatives for the future development 
of their territories, for suffering any adverse effects,” as well as for the “significant social capital they 
contribute under the totality of historical and contemporary circumstances.”234 As discussed above, 
these elements are unlikely to be captured in impact assessments, but could be more systematically 
addressed in strategic environmental assessments, as recommended above.235 
The practice of the Inter-American Court also points to some overlap in terms of aims of 
compensation and benefit-sharing. Reparations for material and immaterial damage (with the former 
including environmental damage affecting indigenous peoples' subsistence and spiritual connection 
with their territory)236 may take the form of community development funds (as a form of collective 
reparation) with a view to contributing to enhancing the protection and development of indigenous 
peoples’ cultural identity, and guaranteeing the control of their territories. These funds are further 
expected to contribute to indigenous peoples’ development according to their life plans and to their 
present and future needs or enhancing the social and economic condition of the community, including 
                                               
226 CBD, principles of the ecosystem approach (n 79), Operational Guidance 2, para. 9; CBD refinement and elaboration 
of the ecosystem approach (n 79), para 12.5. 
227 Saramaka (Merits), para. 144; Endorois, paras. 235 and 249; and Kaliña and Lokono, paras 35-36. 
228 Saramaka (Merits), paras. 138-140; Kaliña and Lokono, para. 227; Endorois, paras. 298-299 and 295. J Pasqualucci, 
‘International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 27 Wis. Int’l L.J. 51, 92. 
229 Gomez (n 10), 147-148. 
230 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, art 21(2). 
231 Saramaka (Merits), paras. 13 and 140; see also paras. 143, 153, 156 making reference to reasonable share of 
benefits. 
232 Endorois, para. 295. 
233 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/15/37 (n 29), paras. 67, 89 and 91; and A/HRC/24/41 (n 121), para. 76. 
234 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/24/41 (n 121), para. 76. 
235 Section 2.3. 
236 Orellana (n 145), 845 and 847. 
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in terms of increasing the productivity of natural resources or restoring degraded ecosystems.237 
Community development funds can also be a form of benefit-sharing. Nevertheless, Anaya seems to 
suggest that benefit-sharing may make up for broader, historical inequities that have determined the 
situation in which the specific material and immaterial damage has arisen.238 These observations may 
support an argument whereby benefit-sharing is understood as a proactive tool for the full realization 
of human rights connected to natural resources in light of communities’ worldviews.  Benefit-sharing 
can thus be arguably distinguished from compensation that is expected to make up for lost control 
over resources and income-generation opportunities.239 Benefit-sharing combines instead new 
opportunities of income generation and continued, or possibly enhanced, control over the use of the 
lands and resources affected by the development,240 in line with the above-outlined argument about 
support- and control-benefits.241  
Another argument discussed in the Inter-American context can, notwithstanding a certain 
teleological overlap,242 provide a stepping stone for distinguishing compensation from benefit-
sharing. As the Inter-American Court asserted, the creation of a community development fund as 
compensation for material and immaterial damage is “additional to any other benefit present and 
future that communities are owed in relation to the general obligations of development of the 
State.”243 The Inter-American Court contrasted the secondary obligation of compensation, deriving 
from and commensurate to a violation of human rights, and the State’s general obligations to realize 
indigenous peoples’ right to the protection of the environment, the productivity of their territories and 
natural resources,244 and the enhancement of their quality of life.245 It is argued here that a similar 
distinction can apply to fair and equitable benefit-sharing as an inherent component of certain human 
rights: it is therefore part of a general and permanent obligation to protect and realize human rights 
connected to natural resources, that is independent of any violation of these rights and related 
compensation.246 Distinguishing benefit-sharing from compensation for material and immaterial 
damage247 could thus decouple the former from the need to establish a causal nexus between an 
ascertained human rights violation, and a damage arising from the violation.248 This is particularly 
                                               
237 Saramaka (Merits), paras. 201-202; Garífuna de Punta Piedra, paras. 316 and 333; Kaliña and Lokono, para. 272; 
IACtHR, Comunidad Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz y Sus Miembros vs Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 8 
October 2015, para. 296 and concurrent opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto, para. 26. Note also the 
inclusion of benefit-sharing among forms of compensation in T Ankowiak, ‘A Dark Side of Virtue: The Inter-American 
Court and Reparations for Indigenous Peoples’ (2014) 25 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 1, 5. 
238 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/24/41 (n 121), para. 76. Other bodies have not elaborated on the point: UNPFII 
(n 57), para. 27 (2013); Ecuador, ILO Doc. GB.282/14/2, para. 44(c)(3) (2001), and Bolivia, ILO Doc. 
GB.272/8/1:GB.274/16/7, para. 40 (1999). 
239 F Lenzerini, ‘Reparations for Indigenous Peoples in International and Comparative Law: An Introduction’ in 
Lenzerini (n 6) 3, 13-14. See also D Shelton, ‘Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: The Present Value of Past Wrongs’ 
in Lenzerini (n 6) 47, 60-61 and 66-69. 
240 Morgera (n 20), on the basis of Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/HRC/21/47 (n 21), paras. 68, 74 and 76 and 
A/HRC/24/41 (n 121), para. 75. 
241 See section 2.2 above. 
242 See discussion on potential for reparations to aim at restorative justice and be forward-looking (and controversy 
around that notion) in Shelton (n 239), 72. See also Gomez (n 10), 147-148. 
243 Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz, para. 295; Garífuna de Punta Piedra, 332; Kaliña and Lokono, para. 295. 
244 In light of UNDRIP art 29(1): Garífuna de Punta Piedra, para. 333. Note, however, that the distinction between 
primary duties to fulfil general human rights from the secondary duty to provide reparation for violations of indigenous 
and tribal peoples’ rights connected to natural resources remains to be clearly drawn: Gomez (n 10), 149. 
245 Such as ILO Convention 169, art 2.2.b: “promoting the full realization of the social, economic and cultural rights of 
these peoples with respect for their social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions and their institutions”: 
Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz, concurrent opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto, para. 30-31.  
246 This interpretation appears supported by ILA (n 22, 42-43) with regard to UNDRIP art 32(2) and opportunities 
offered by indigenous lands to develop economic projects. 
247 Orellana (n 145), 845 and 847. 
248 And generally “restricts damage to provable, proximate losses to avoid excessive recovery,” although it includes 
some flexibility in the name of proportionality and equity: Shelton (n 239) 60.  
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significant in light of the Inter-American Court’s tendency to mitigate a State’s financial burden in 
cases concerning communities, and its inadequate account of the difficulties of indigenous and tribal 
peoples to document environmental and cultural harm.249  
Admittedly, the Court’s remarks about “any other benefit present and future that communities 
are owed in relation to the general obligations of development of the State” may also refer to the 
State’s obligations to realize the generally applicable civil and political, as well as economic, social 
and cultural rights of the population at large. This raises the issue of distinguishing benefit-sharing as 
an inherent component of human rights connected to natural resources, from the State’s general duty 
to fulfil general human rights, which is hard to do in practice. In effect, it has been empirically 
observed that “communities are losing out on any additional benefits that may otherwise have been 
provided through benefit-sharing”250 when the State has not delivered basic services to these 
communities. To provide an example, when a community consented to laying fibre optics in its 
traditional territory, it obtained as benefit-sharing the overdue issuance of IDs for its members, and 
free internet for the community school, but not for all community households. This example serves 
to reiterate the importance of thinking strategically about the interface of benefit-sharing with 
assessments and FPIC, as prior assessments could scope more broadly and proactively possible 
benefits in accordance with communities’ worldviews. It also reinforces the argument made above 
about the importance of strategic environmental assessments to factor in historical and systemic 
issues that affect the understanding of benefits beyond decision-making at the individual project level.  
 
 
3. The legal status of benefit-sharing at the intersection of international biodiversity and human 
rights law 
 
At present, the emergence of fair and equitable benefit-sharing obligations in relation to the rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples over natural resources, and the rights of other communities that are 
connected to natural resources, is largely supported by authoritative interpretations, rather than 
unequivocal treaty provisions. In addition, the evolutionary interpretation of international human rights 
law is not yet firmly based on systematic and coherent reliance on international biodiversity law. Even 
after the clarifications provided by the UN Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, 
there remains significant scope for scholars to assess the level of State support, particularly where 
key interpretative questions may not have been clearly and coherently addressed in universal, regional 
and domestic processes. Nevertheless, as Special Rapporteur Knox has argued, at the very least 
growing “coherence in the interpretation by binding human rights tribunals and authoritative human 
rights bodies” crystallizes “best practices” that serve to “facilitate the implementation” of existing 
international obligations,251  providing “strong evidence of the converging trends towards greater 
uniformity and certainty in the understanding.”252 On the side of international biodiversity law, the legal 
nature of relevant CBD provisions has been openly contested.253 In addition, the qualifications in the 
CBD guidance represent disagreement among CBD Parties as to whether certain interpretations are 
reflecting existing or emerging international law, based also on the fact that each individual Party to 
the CBD may not have formally accepted the same underlying international human rights norms. At 
                                               
249 Ankowiak (n 237) 5. 
250 Wynberg & Hauck (n 30), 158. 
 251. Knox (n 2), paras 7–8. 
 252. To use the terminology employed by Knox (n 2), paras 7-9. See generally, C Buckley, A Donald and P Leach 
(eds), Towards Convergence in International Human Rights Law: Approaches of Regional and International Systems 
(Brill, 2016). 
253 See generally S Harrop and D Pritchard, ‘A Hard Instrument Goes Soft: The Implications of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’s Current Trajectory’ (2011) 21 Global Envt’l Change 474; and Construction of a Road in Costa 
Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), ICJ 16 December 2015, (Road Case) para. 164, which 
focused on CBD art 14 on environmental assessments that has provided the basis for interpretative developments 
related to benefit-sharing in international biodiversity and human rights law, as discussed above. 
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the very least, guidance adopted as consensus decisions under the CBD should also be considered a 
crystallization of “best practices” that serve to “facilitate the implementation” of existing international 
obligations. It thus becomes increasingly difficult for a State to defend an approach that goes against 
an internationally recognized best practice, particularly when it has intensely participated in 
intergovernmental negotiations and eventually agreed upon the formulation of such best practices.254 
Against this backdrop, the above-outlined mutually supportive interpretation of international human 
rights and biodiversity law may support an original reflection on the legal status of an international 
benefit-sharing obligation at the intersection of these two areas. This section will thus shed new light 
on this matter by reflecting on the legal bases for benefit-sharing in international human rights law 
and the interplay of benefit-sharing with consent and impact assessment. 
Benefit-sharing obligations have been associated with a variety of inter-linked human rights, 
such as indigenous peoples’ right to freely dispose of their natural resources,255 which is connected 
with their right to freely determine and enjoy their own social, cultural and economic development, 
as well as the right to enjoy their way of life that is closely associated with the use of resources256 
upon which their cultural identity depends.257 The Inter-American Court substantiated these rights on 
the basis of its notoriously evolutive understanding of the right to property,258 in connection with the 
right to self-determination under common Article 1 of the two Covenants,259 and the right to culture 
under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.260 For its part, the African 
Commission focused, in addressing benefit-sharing, on the right to development, which is explicitly 
provided for under the African Charter, but it argued that its interpretation also built on the Inter-
American Court and CERD jurisprudence.261 In effect, successive Inter-American Court’s cases in 
the line of the Saramaka jurisprudence, have elaborated upon the notion of development as part of 
the need to ensure the physical and cultural survival of indigenous peoples by protecting their right 
to natural resources.262 In addition, the Inter-American Court equated explicit mechanisms that 
guarantee effective benefit-sharing with political rights, relying on the CBD obligation on 
environmental impact assessments.263 Overall, benefit-sharing has emerged as part of an evolving 
understanding of “overlapping and multi-layered international human rights grounded on the centrality of 
natural resources for the identity and recognition of indigenous and tribal peoples.”264  
                                               
254 E Morgera, ‘Dawn of a New Day? The Evolving Relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
International Human Rights Law’ (2018) 54 Wake Forest Law Review. 
255 Comunidad Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz, para. 167. This interpretation is now enshrined in American Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016), Art XXIX. See also Endorois, paras. 120-124. 
256 Saramaka (Merits), paras. 93-95 on the basis also of Inter-American Convention, art 29(b). Reiterated in Kaliña and 
Lokono, para. 124. For a succinct discussion of previous case law, see e.g. Århén (n 5), 93. 
257 Kaliña and Lokono, paras. 181 and 193. 
258 Art 21 of American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 
1144 UNTS 123. Saramaka (Merits), paras. 115 and 120; based on IACtHR, Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v Nicaragua (Judgment) (31 August 2001). 
259 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 26 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. See generally J 
Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (OUP, 2004), 104-106 and 129-131; and Århén (n 5). 
260 HRC, Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, Comm No 167/1984 (26 March 1990) UN Doc. Supp No 40 (A/45/40) and 
Ángela Poma Poma v Peru, Comm No 1457/2006 (27 March 2009) UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006. This approach 
has been confirmed by the ICJ, Navigational and Related Rights (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Judgment) 13 July 2009, 
[2009] ICJ Reports 213. 
261 Endorois, paras. 294 and 296. As to the former, the African Commission presumably referred to Saramaka (Merits), 
paras, 93-95, and Saramaka (Interpretation), para. 46. CERD, General Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples, 
UN Doc. A/52/18, annex V, para. 4 (1997); CERD, Concluding Observations on Ecuador, UN Doc. A/58/18, para. 62 
(2003). 
262 Comunidad Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz, para. 102; Comunidad Garífuna de Punta Piedra, para. 167. 
263 Kaliña and Lokono, para. 197, relying on CBD art 14 and Rio Principle 17. 
264  G Pentassuglia, ‘Ethnocultural Diversity and Human Rights: Legal Categories, Claims, and the Hybridity of Group 
Protection’ (2015) 6 Yb Polar L 251, 293, 276-277, 294 and 317; IACtHR, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 12 August 2008, 
paras. 25-27; Endorois para 151; Ogiek, para 191. 
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As Special Rapporteur Anaya indicated, benefit-sharing is thus not a new human right, but it 
is rather connected to existing rights,265 in line with the argument that benefit-sharing is implicit in 
indigenous peoples’ human rights to natural resources under UNDRIP mentioned above. This view 
pre-empts the need to prove the emergence of new international obligations than those that have 
already been identified under several, global and regional, human rights treaties. The idea that benefit-
sharing is an inherent component of existing human rights connected to natural resources, 
furthermore, permits to move away from considering benefit-sharing as a mere safeguard, only 
coming into play for the protection of rights (in other words, a defensive tool). Instead, it supports 
the view that benefit-sharing has also the potential to support the realization of these rights (serving 
as a proactive tool).  
In addition to specific treaty bases for specific human rights, the interplay between benefit-
sharing obligations and FPIC can underpin also another argument about the status of the former in 
international law. Benefit-sharing could be seen as part of the general international principle of 
effective consultation.266 As such, it would affect the exercise of States’ discretionary powers in 
relation to the development, interpretation, and application of international law even in the absence 
of an applicable treaty basis.267 This argument may be well suited for the international benefit-sharing 
obligations towards local (non-indigenous) communities268 whose human rights to participation, culture 
and subsistence are intrinsically connected to natural resources,269 but whose status in international law 
remains unclear.270 
In addition, in understanding the common thread among multiple rights and multiple 
rightholders, the link between benefit-sharing and non-discrimination has been emphasized by former 
UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment John Knox. He considered benefit-
sharing as an “additional measure to protect those who are most vulnerable to, or at particular risk 
from, environmental harm,” with a view to complementing effective measures against the underlying 
conditions that cause or help to perpetuate discrimination. This is the case of measures (such as 
mining and logging concessions) that have disproportionately severe effects on communities that rely 
on ecosystems, or that are likely to cause environmental harm reinforcing historical or persistent 
prejudice against groups of individuals.271 Accordingly, it would be discriminatory to take as criteria 
for traditional occupation or use a certain amount of continuity or patterns of sufficiently intense use 
on the basis of the larger society’s understanding. Rather, benefit-sharing obligations arise also from 
the use of resources that are possessed without title272 or for which communities unwillingly lost 
possession273 and are therefore shared with majority population, as long as there is continuity in 
                                               
265 At the beginning of his mandate, UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples' Rights, James Anaya, hypothesized 
that benefit-sharing could be a right in itself: A/HRC/15/37 (n 29), paras. 67 and 76-78, but his more definite argument 
focused on benefit-sharing as a safeguard ancillary to existing rights: A/HRC/21/47 (n 22), paras. 52 and 62.   
266 Comunidad Garífuna de Punta Piedra, para. 222; Pentassuglia (n 18), 176 sees benefit-sharing as “expanding on the 
principle of effective participation”. 
267 A Boyle & C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), 222–225. 
268 UN Framework Principle 15 (n 2); CBD, arts 8(j) and 10(c); Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security (VGGT) (2012), art 8.6; and FAO, Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable 
Small-scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (2013), para 5.1. 
269 UN Framework Principle 15 (n 2), para 41(d) and (g) and 48; O De Schutter, 'The Emerging Human Right to Land' 
(2010) 12 Int'l Community L Rev 303, 319 and 324–325; Pentassuglia (n 38), 157; and C Doyle & J Gilbert, 
‘Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: From “Development Aggression” to “Self-Determined Development”’ (2008/9) 
7 Eur. Y.B. Minority Issues 219. 
270 Note, eg, votes against and abstentions concerning the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and 
Other People Working in Rural Areas, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/12 (2018) at the Human Rights Council; CBD Decisions 
X/43 (2010), para 21 and XI/14 (2012), para 19. 
271 UN Framework Principles (n 2), para 9. 
272 Endorois, paras. 204-207. 
273 Endorois, para. 209. 
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indigenous peoples’ terms of “values” and “shared mentality” related to these resources.274 Focusing 
on non-discrimination as the cross-cutting legal basis of benefit-sharing under international human 
rights law has the potential for a two-fold clarification. First, it reveals the strategic advantage of 
relying on, among available human rights treaty bases, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, which is the most widely applicable (179 Parties) in those countries that are not party 
to the Inter-American or African regional treaties and that have expressed limitations to their 
implementation of UNDRIP. CERD has systematically relied on the findings of the Inter-American 
Court on benefit-sharing,275 arguably indicating that it is an inherent component of indigenous 
peoples’ rights to natural resources and that it differs from damages.276 Second, the connection 
between benefit-sharing and non-discrimination could support the argument that an international 
benefit-sharing obligation is part and parcel of the customary international law prohibition of 
discrimination on racial grounds,277 which binds States even in the absence of applicable treaty bases 
and is considered ius cogens, thereby prevailing over other treaty provisions.  
Another common normative thread could also be explored – human dignity. This concept was 
only mentioned once by the Inter-American Court,278 but scholarship on human dignity and the 
environment arguably provides a broader, coherent framework for understanding benefit-sharing in 
the context of overlapping human rights of indigenous peoples and local communities. Human dignity 
encompasses the interplay of self-determination (agency and autonomy in determining the course of 
one’s life), subsistence (material dignity as the minimum conditions for physical and cultural 
existence), non-discrimination (the right to be acknowledged as equals against the background of 
historically entrenched and pervasive discrimination) and political participation (the opportunity for 
rightholders to preserve their identity and culture as part of broader society).279 Human dignity is seen 
as a collective right (to be exercised as part of one’s community and one’s society) and as a collective 
obligation. From the latter perspective, it requires, on the one hand, not just protection, but also 
support from the State, which can be related to the various forms of non-monetary benefits identified 
under the CBD. On the other hand, a collective obligation also entails efforts from all to respect the 
dignity of every other, in ways that are contextual to the history and present challenges of a society.280  
Overall, the relevance of benefit-sharing for non-discrimination and human dignity of 
indigenous peoples and other communities remains to be studied more fully. There is significant scope 
for scholars to further explore and advocates to test the proposed mutually supportive interpretation 
outlined above. 
 
 
4.  Business responsibility to respect human rights connected to natural resources 
 
In light of the widespread recognition that private companies have a responsibility to respect 
internationally recognized human rights over and above what is required of them by national laws, 
                                               
274 Århén (n 5), 179. Ogiek, para 185. Note that the concept of “tradition” is contested in anthropological studies: eg R 
Ellen et al (eds.), Indigenous Environmental Knowledge and Its Transformation: Critical Anthropological Perspectives 
(Harwood Academics, 2000). 
275 Eg CERD (n 51). 
276 J Gilbert, “CERD’s Contribution to the Development of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples under International Law” 
in D Keane and A Waughray (eds), Fifty Years of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination: A Living Instrument (Manchester University Press, 2017) on the basis of CERD/C/63/CO/2 and 
CERD/C/PER/CO/18-21. 
277 IACtHR, Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment (24 August 2010), Sect. 3.1 and n. 37; see 
Fodella (n 24), 358. 
278 Kaliña and Lokono, paras. 181 and 193 referring to the “right to a dignified life … connected with natural resources 
on … traditional territories.”. 
279 E Daly, Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions and the Worth of the Human Person (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2013) 5, 40, 59-60 and 119. 
280 Ibid, 119-121. 
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and independently of States’ abilities and willingness to fulfil their human rights obligations, 281 this 
section will discuss cross-fertilization between international human rights and biodiversity law on 
benefit-sharing with regard to business responsibility to respect the human rights of indigenous 
peoples. This cross-fertilization has provided more specific international benchmarks for: i) the 
private sector to guide its own conduct so as to prevent conflicts over natural resources with 
communities; ii) for community advocates to hold the private sector accountable for alleged 
substandard environmental and human rights practices in the natural resource sector; and iii) for 
international monitoring mechanisms to provide independent fact-finding and mediation services.282 
This section will also analyse the relevance of the interplay among fair and equitable benefit-sharing, 
FPIC, impact assessment and compensation, for business due diligence. In addition, as States retain 
ultimate responsibility to ensure compliance with international human rights law by private 
companies,283 relevant international standards also serve to clarify States’ obligations to develop and 
enforce legislation, and provide access to justice, to ensure that businesses exercise due diligence.284 
This section will thus complement the previous discussion of State obligations with additional 
considerations concerning the oversight of contractual practices related to benefit-sharing, as well as 
the negotiation and enforcement of State-investors agreements. 
 
4.1. International standards for business responsibility  
 
A plethora of international legal materials point to the applicability of socio-cultural and 
environmental impact assessment, FPIC and benefit-sharing to business enterprises in the natural 
resource sector.285 In particular, UN Special Rapporteur Anaya and the UN Expert Mechanism on 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights have relied on CBD materials286 to argue that business responsibility in 
the extractives sector287 includes benefit-sharing288 and depends on companies facilitating indigenous 
peoples’ full access to information about potential financial benefits, even when this information is 
                                               
281 Special Representative Ruggie, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to implement the UN Protect, 
Respect and Remedy Framework”, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011), adopted by the Human Rights Council (Res 17/4 
(2011)) and “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights”, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/35 
(2008), which the Human Rights Council recognized the need to operationalize (Res 8/7 (2008), para. 2) and the Expert 
Mechanism (n 5), para 21, considered “authoritative global standard for addressing business-related human rights 
challenges.” Note, however, that the Human Rights Council established in 2014 a process to elaborate an international 
legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises and human rights: HRC Res 
26/9 (June 25, 2014). See also ILA, Second Report of the Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law (July 
2016) 27-39. 
282 E Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
283 Special Rapporteur Anaya, Extractive industries operating within or near indigenous territories, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/18/35, para. 63 (2011); UN Expert Mechanism (n 5), para. 8; and Shelton (n 74), 553. 
284 Draft General Comment on State Obligations under the ICESCR in the context of Business Activities, 
UN Doc. E/C.12/60/R.1, paras. 17-21 (2016). 
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considered proprietary (in which case, it should be shared on a confidential basis).289 In addition, 
CBD guidelines call for adequate and balanced information from a variety of sources to be made 
available in accessible terms and indigenous or local languages, to ensure that all parties to a benefit-
sharing agreement have the same understanding of the information and terms provided.290 Anaya 
added that in exercising due diligence, companies must identify, prior to commencing activities, all 
matters related to indigenous peoples’ rights and recognise their social and political structures, as 
well as their possession and use of land and natural resources.291  
Similarly to States’ benefit-sharing obligations, Anaya also emphasized that companies should 
consider benefit-sharing as a tool to create genuinely equal partnerships with indigenous peoples.292 
He therefore criticised common corporate practices envisaging benefit-sharing as compensation, as a 
charitable award or as a favour granted to secure social support for a project.293 Anaya instead 
envisaged that, if indigenous peoples themselves do not wish or are unable to initiate resource 
extraction, benefit-sharing entitles them to participate in project decision-making and share in their 
profits through an agreement with outside companies (for instance, through a minority ownership 
interest in the extractive operations).294 This points to the need for both enhanced participation 
opportunities and income generation for indigenous peoples – the procedural and substantive side of 
benefit-sharing, as discussed above. Accordingly, this would also imply moving away from an 
exclusive focus on damage prevention to a proactive and collaborative identification of benefit-
sharing opportunities according to indigenous peoples’ worldviews.295  
In 2017 UN Special Rapporteur Knox clarified that similar standards to those spelt out for 
business and other non-State actors in extractives are also relevant for private operators involved in 
conservation.296 The intergovernmental consensus achieved under the CBD on indigenous and 
community conserved areas was considered particularly instructive in this connection,297 starting 
from the need to recognise, respect and support community-based approaches to conservation and 
the integration of communities in governance and management arrangements.298 
Experience with business-community benefit-sharing models, however, has been far from 
clearly beneficial towards indigenous peoples, as they have involved unfair pricing and 
indebtedness.299 Several other concerns arise with regard to the use of contractual tools for incorporating 
benefit-sharing agreements, which generally provide the form for “mutually agreed” benefits, as referred 
by both human rights bodies and CBD Parties for a contextual application of benefit-sharing.300 
Contractual negotiations may in principle function as a dialogic partnership-building process between 
private companies and communities. But leaving a contextual determination of fairness and equity to 
contractual freedom has raised concerns in the face of the well-documented, unequal negotiating 
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powers, as well as information and capacity asymmetries.301 These concerns are compounded by 
objective difficulties in reconciling communities’ customary law within dominant legal systems,302 
including in connection with dispute resolution.  
In principle, benefit-sharing contracts may provide an opportunity to “co-author” the terms of 
cooperation with third parties.303 Contracts may incorporate community worldviews as principles of 
interpretation, and/or as elements determining the fairness and equity in benefit-sharing.304 They may 
also incorporate reference to international human rights standards305 to substantiate contractual 
obligations to respect community worldviews. Such an incorporation of different worldviews in 
contractual arrangements faces several practical challenges deriving from the limited opportunities 
for full and effective community engagement in contractual negotiations and likely clashing with the 
developer’s commercial demands for expediency and cost-effectiveness.306 A further layer of 
complexity arises from confidentiality clauses in benefit-sharing agreements, which limits cross-
community communication of lessons learnt in negotiating benefit-sharing.307 These fundamental 
challenges add to significant technical difficulties in accounting, calculating benefits and ensuring 
environmental sustainability, that require significant administrative capacity. For these reasons, 
Anaya recommended that business’ benefit-sharing contribute to “genuinely strengthen the capacity 
of indigenous peoples to establish and pursue their own development priorities and that help 
indigenous peoples to make their own decision-making mechanisms and institutions more 
effective”.308 Support-benefits should thus also be provided by private companies, with a view to 
enabling communities to play increasingly more significant roles in development projects.309  
Some evidence has been accrued that business-community benefit-sharing arrangements can 
avoid paternalistic approaches and genuinely serve communities’ vision for their economic 
participation and enterprise development, rather than mere accumulation and distribution of profit.310 
This can be the case of genuine agreement on benefits involving access to and management of natural 
resources, heritage management, and decommissioning, which should be clearly additional to the 
protection of the right to engage in traditional activities311 - the control-benefits discussed above.312  
 
4.2 State obligations in the context of private contracts and investment agreements 
 
A recent analysis in the Canadian context has underscored that despite their private law nature, 
business-community benefit-sharing contracts are meant to secure public benefits, as an indirect 
means for the governments to comply with international and constitutional obligations towards 
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indigenous peoples.313 From the government perspective, these contracts incorporate the findings of 
impact assessments, as well as provide for follow-up and monitoring obligations mandated by 
national law.314 With regard to the role of States, CBD guidelines have focused on the need for 
practical cooperation between the government and communities to support negotiations with private 
companies and implementation of private contracts,315 by setting standard contractual clauses, 
establishing direct payments, or creating trust funds.316 Financial support or capacity-building to 
address challenges in contractual arrangements, however, are rarely provided by States.317 On the 
other hand, indigenous groups may have recourse to confidentiality to prevent governments from 
using knowledge of agreed benefits as a justification to reduce their entitlements.318  
Business enterprises themselves, in responding to a questionnaire circulated by Special 
Rapporteur Anaya, have lamented the lack of clear regulatory frameworks on benefit-sharing at the 
national level.319 Commentators have argued that States’ obligations to develop domestic benefit-
sharing measures need to require companies to share benefits with all community members, rather 
than only those directly participating in joint ventures, through different stages of the project cycle.320 
Furthermore, national legal frameworks need to determine the extent to which developers will be held 
responsible for monitoring project impacts, disseminating information and using it to inform periodic 
reviews of benefit-sharing agreements in light of international standards of best practice.321 As 
discussed above, the need for legal rules in relation to benefit-sharing is a dimension of State 
obligations that is often under-emphasized in international biodiversity law also with regard to 
effective regulation and control of private actors. Instead, domestic legislation is needed to ensure 
that benefit-sharing serves as a “limit to contractual autonomy,” on the basis of international human 
rights law.322 
With regard to the role of governments in ensuring the fairness of contractual arrangements, 
former UN Special Rapporteur Anaya underlined that “the State remains ultimately responsible for 
any inadequacy in the consultation or negotiation procedures and therefore should employ measures 
to oversee and evaluate the procedures and their outcomes, and especially to mitigate against power 
imbalances between the companies and the indigenous peoples with which they negotiate.”323 To this 
end, consultations carried out directly by private companies with indigenous peoples should be 
supervised by the State.324  States are also to verify that benefit-sharing agreements with extractive 
industries are crafted on the basis of full respect for indigenous peoples' rights.325  
On the ground, some evidence points to substantive positive impacts of government’s 
participation in negotiations between communities and companies.326 But communities themselves 
may not wish to involve the government out of concern that the contract may become a source of 
external control (including on the distribution of benefits within the community).327 More generally, 
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communities could find themselves in an adversarial relationship with the government, as different 
State entities may have a vested interest in the negotiations. One approach to address these concerns 
would be relying on national human rights ombudsman as semi-independent government entities that 
can mediate and facilitate negotiations between private companies and communities, including by 
signalling when proposals may be undermining existing human rights. 
Even more complexity surrounds community negotiations with private operators that are 
foreign investors. These negotiations may be constrained by the terms of an investor-State contract, 
which may limit the types of benefits to be made available, such as local employment and local 
business opportunities.328 While there is still limited international guidance on this, certain roles for 
the State can be identified. States could include in their agreement with investors an obligation for 
the latter to conclude a benefit-sharing agreement with communities, determining goals and minimum 
parameters below which the investor-community agreement cannot go.329 This would allow the 
government to monitor and enforce possible violations of the investor-community benefit-sharing 
contract, including by sanctioning the violation of key terms of benefit-sharing contracts with the 
termination of State-investor agreements.330  
Overall, the use of private and/or public instruments for encapsulating mutually agreed benefit-
sharing remains a matter for further study in international environmental, human rights and 
investment law. Much remains to be understood about the actual room for communities’ worldviews 
to be expressed, understood and realized within contractual, investment, and corporate legal tools and 
structures.331 More research is required on the necessary oversight of benefit-sharing agreements, 
including with regard to integrating in such scrutiny also indigenous procedural and substantive 
standards.332 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
Fair and equitable benefit-sharing has gradually emerged as an inherent component of human rights 
connected to natural resources in its interplay with impact assessment and FPIC. This represents a 
growing area of cross-fertilization between international human rights and biodiversity law, even if 
the latter generally avoids human rights language. While such cross-fertilization is still incipient, this 
analysis has pointed to further opportunities for a fully-fledged mutually supportive interpretation of 
benefit-sharing. Human rights standards can help identify the minimum content of States’ benefit-
sharing obligations, notably in relation to necessary procedural guarantees that tend to remain 
unspecified in international biodiversity law. This is a significant contribution in limiting State 
discretion in the choice of means of implementation under the CBD and enhancing justiciability. 
International biodiversity law, in turn, provides specific guidelines on how to put human rights 
precepts in practice within the complex landscape of environmental regulation, thereby emphasizing 
the potentially proactive purpose of impact assessments, FPIC and benefit-sharing to support the full 
realization of indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ rights, rather than just their protection. 
The exploration of the full potential for a mutually supportive interpretation has led to a series 
of further normative arguments. First, benefit-sharing has both a procedural dimension (communities’ 
agency in the context of a concerned and iterative dialogue aimed at understanding and 
accommodating different worldviews) and a substantive one (the enhancement of communities’ 
choice and capabilities). To realize the latter, both benefits protecting or enhancing communities’ 
control over natural resources, and benefits providing support for the exercise of effective control are 
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needed. Second, the interplay between benefit-sharing, impact assessment and FPIC highlights 
opportunities to move away from a technocratic, damage-control approach to natural resource 
development, by shifting to collaboratively identifying and understanding opportunities for positive 
impacts according to indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ worldviews, in addition to potential 
negative impacts. This calls for re-thinking the scope and methodological approach of existing impact 
assessments at the national level. In addition, the consideration of alternatives and of the justification 
of the final outcome need to evidence how assessments differed from merely providing a pre-set of 
development options to indigenous peoples.  
With regard to FPIC, the interplay with benefit-sharing serves to identify circumstances under 
which indigenous peoples would be legitimately entitled to say “no” to proposed extractive operations 
or the creation of protected areas affecting traditionally owned or used resources, or having the 
potential to negatively impact on traditionally used resources threatening the indigenous peoples’ 
cultural and physical survival. Such circumstances include the lack of an early, genuine and cultural 
appropriate identification and discussion of benefits according to communities’ worldviews; or the 
lack of any impact for communities on the final outcome of benefit-sharing discussions, without 
sufficient reasons to justify such an outcome. Furthermore, benefit-sharing should be distinguished 
from compensation, as the latter represents a secondary obligation deriving from and commensurate 
to a violation of the right to natural resources, whereas benefit-sharing should be seen as part and 
parcel of the general and permanent obligation that is independent of any violation of their rights and 
related compensation. These considerations have implications also for business due diligence to 
respect natural resource-related human rights, and for States’ obligations to ensure business due 
diligence through domestic law-making, enforcement and access to justice, including oversight of 
contractual and international investment agreements. 
Ultimately, the value and limitations of proposed interpretation on fair and equitable benefit-
sharing will likely be tested through cross-compliance of international biodiversity law by international 
human rights processes,333 as compliance mechanisms under multilateral environmental agreements are 
less accessible to non-State actors and have little to offer in terms of redress.334 Opportunities for cross-
compliance could therefore be more fully explored by scholars and activists alike. 
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